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A CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSION SLIP
FOR RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
It is no secret of history that the principalities of government and
religion, when not producing oppression from their merger, are
necessarily generating friction from their separation.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1791, the states adopted the First Amendment to the
Constitution. The amendment places various constitutional
restrictions on government. The Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses, for example, provide that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."2 These religion clauses primarily
seek to prevent coerced religious adherence and to guarantee
the free exercise of one's chosen religious beliefs.3
' Scott C. Idleman, The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing
Religion in the Culture of Disbelief, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1994).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
' Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)); see also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992)
(stating that "the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so") (citations
omitted); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (stating that the
Establishment Clause means at least that neither a state nor the federal govern-
ment may 'force [or] influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion," and
that no person "can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs for church attendance or non-attendance"); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (J.
Gales ed. 1834) (noting that James Madison, the principal draftsman of the First
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Despite the articulated mandates in the First Amendment,
little consensus exists on the constitutional parameters of the
religion clauses, particularly the Establishment Clause. One
interpretation of the Establishment Clause is that the Consti-
tution mandates the total separation of church and state.4 The
Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument, and has
recognized that removing all governmental references to reli-
gion would be neither possible nor desirable.5 Rather, the Es-
tablishment Clause requires only that government maintain a
Amendment, interpreted the religion clauses to mean that "Congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience").
For a detailed discussion of the history leading up to the enactment of the
First Amendment, see ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982)
and ANSON STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1964); see also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 219 (1963) (quoting
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948)) (noting that the primary
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to preclude government from "becoming
embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts which permeate
the history of our country").
' The view that the Constitution mandates a total separation of church and
state can be traced back to a letter written by Thomas Jefferson who interpreted
the religion clauses as "building a wall of separation between church and state."
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861)); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating that separation of church and state was intended
to create "a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or sup-
port for religion").
r See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (quoting Zorach v.
Clauson 342 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)) (finding that the Establishment Clause does not
compel a complete separation of church and state); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 309
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that complete separation is "fallacious" since the
two institutions necessarily must interact); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952) (recognizing that some relationship between government and religious orga-
nizations is inevitable).
One reason the two institutions necessarily must interact is that religion is,
and has been, a major influence in shaping our society. See, e.g., JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 168 (1987) (explaining
the role of religion in abolishing slavery); Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom
and the Challenge of the Modern State, 39 EMORY L.J. 149 (1990) (discussing the
role of religion in family life, education and social welfare during the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Politics
Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on
Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1990) (discussing role of religion in moti-
vating people to engage in the civil rights movement). Religion, therefore, should
not be completely excluded from the public sphere, particularly from public educa-
tion. See infra note 30 (discussing justifications for including religion in the public
education curriculum).
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position of neutrality toward religion.6 To maintain this neu-
trality, a statute or governmental action may neither advance
one religion over another nor prefer religion over nonreligion'
Establishment clause jurisprudence demonstrates, howev-
er, that no reliable method exists to determine whether a stat-
ute or governmental action constitutes an advancement or
preference of religion in violation of the clause. Interactions
between government and religion can be placed on a continu-
um, with the Supreme Court easily deciding cases on the ex-
tremes.8 On one end are state laws that overtly coerce adher-
ence to religious beliefs. For example, the colonies and the
early states enacted laws that required taxpayers to support
state churches financially and mandated attendance at Sunday
services.9 Failure to comply with these laws resulted in crimi-
nal or civil punishment. Where religious exercises were man-
dated in public schools, students faced expulsion for noncompli-
ance.1" On the other end of the continuum are laws that few
would challenge as constitutionally infirm. For instance, the
Establishment Clause permits religious institutions to take
advantage of generally applicable laws, such as tax exemp-
tions." The more difficult task for the Court is to determine
6 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215 (holding that the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses place government in a position of neutrality toward religion).
7 Id. at 216.
8 Because Supreme Court decisions lay the framework for the lower courts to
follow, this Note will focus on Supreme Court precedent.
' See generally Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Reli-
gion in the Public Schools, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 73 (1963) (discussing the history of
religion in the United States). Two examples of improper relationships between
government and religion include New Amsterdam, where citizens were required to
pay taxes to construct church buildings, and Pennsylvania, where public officers
were obligated to profess their belief in Jesus Christ upon taking office. Id. at 78
n.33.
1" See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (inval-
idating a West Virginia statute that permitted schools to expel students for refus-
ing, based on religious objections, to stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance);
Commonwealth v. Cook, 7 AL.R. 417 (1859) (upholding a teacher's beating of a
child's hands for 30 minutes after the student refused to recite the Ten Command.
ments); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854) (upholding a Maine statute that
expelled students who refused to read from the Bible).
" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (explaining that a tax ex-
emption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer its revenue to
churches, but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state).
Tax exemptions have not converted libraries, art galleries or hospitals into state
supported institutions, nor should they be deemed to convert churches into state
1995]
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where on this continuum the distinction between constitutional
and unconstitutional governmental actions lies. 2
Since 1971, the Court has used a three-prong test promul-
gated in Lemon v. Kurtzman 3 (the "Lemon test") to determine
the constitutionality of state actions involving religion. 4 To
withstand an establishment clause challenge under the Lemon
test a statute must have a legitimate secular purpose; cannot
advance or inhibit religion; and must not create an excessive
entanglement of government with religion.1" The three factors
mirror the primary aims of the Establishment Clause: to pre-
vent governmental sponsorship, financial support of, or in-
volvement in religious matters. Despite these three articulated
factors, application of the Lemon test has yielded inconsistent
results, leading some commentators and justices to seek its
modification and even abandonment. 6 Indeed, the Supreme
supported institutions. Id. at 675; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (finding that providing interpreter services to student at-
tending Catholic high school did not violate Establishment Clause).
' See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (recognizing that courts
can only "dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinary sensitive
area of constitutional law" and stating that the division between constitutional and
unconstitutional activities is a "blurred, indistinct and variable barrier"); see also
Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that Minnesota statute satisfies the
three-prong test set forth in Lemon and did not violate the Establishment Clause).
403 U.S. at 602.
' Id. at 612-13.
16 Id.
1 See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Claus-
es, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 151 (1987). Professor Beschle points out that the tests used to detect free
exercise and establishment clause violations elicit criticism based on their vague
language, the inconsistent results of their application and the tests' validity. Id. at
163-64. Cf. infra notes 106-12, 168-88 (discussing an alternate approach to the
Lemon test). Indeed, several Supreme Court Justices have criticized the Lemon
test. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-5000 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("in many ap-
plications [the Lemon test] has been utterly meaningless"); Allegheny County v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that he does "not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopt-
ing, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area"); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 636 and 40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ur cases
interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Estab-
lishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only
guess what motives will be held unconstitutional" and that this is the result of a
test that "has no basis in the . . . history of the Amendment it seeks to inter-
pret"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that difficulties in applying the Lemon test arise because the test has "no
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Court acknowledged that it has "sacrifice[d] clarity and pre-
dictability for flexibility" in establishment clause decisions to
achieve specific results in certain cases.'7
The first two prongs of the Lemon test are particularly
vulnerable to criticism. Currently, under the first prong, the
Court evaluates the personal beliefs and motivations of indi-
vidual legislators to determine whether they have a legitimate
secular purpose for enacting a statute.'" This inquiry raises
many concerns. Not only is determining the subjective motiva-
tions that prompt legislators to vote for legislation inherently
difficult, 9 but this inquiry also inhibits the free speech neces-
sary for a healthy political system. °
The Court's second-prong analysis, which uses two
subtests to determine whether an action advances or inhibits
religion, also presents problems. Primarily, the subtests are
overinclusive, resulting in frequent invalidation of state actions
that should be deemed constitutional.' The Court also fails to
apply the subtests consistently. This inconsistent application
has led to inconsistent results and a lack of predictabilityY
more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory
upon which it rests and the three-part [Lemon] test represents a determined effort
to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine"); Roemer v. Maryland
Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring); see also
Kevin T. Baine, Education Litigation: Prospects for Change, 35 OATH. LAW. 283,
287 (1994) ("the Supreme Court has decided a series of education cases that, read
together, simply defy comprehension").
7 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980). Justice Scalia criticized this approach in his dissent in Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). He stated the Court should realize that the flexi-
bility-over-predictability rationale for its inconsistent results is merely a facade for
a lack of a principled rationale. Id. at 638-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, he
argued, the Court should modify its constitutional analysis in establishment clause
cases to formulate a test that allows for both flexibility and predictability while
adhering to the nation's longstanding recognition of the importance of religion. Id.
See generally Wrilliam P. Marshall, "We Know it When We See It": The Supreme
Court Establishment Clause, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (explaining that
"logical consistency and establishment clause jurisprudence ... have little in com-
mon").
" See infra notes 80-105 (discussing problems with the Court's first-prong anal-
ysis).
See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
27 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
21 The two subtests are the endorsement test and coercion test. See infra notes
116-50 and accompanying text.
' Marshall, supra note 17, at 495.
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Additionally, the Court frequently has upheld religious activi-
ties such as legislative prayer or references to God in presiden-
tial speeches because these practices traditionally have been
permitted in society.' While these results may be correct, the
Court's failure to explain how these actions comport with the
Establishment Clause only complicates the task of establishing
a clear constitutional principle.24
Attempts to introduce religious activities into public school
classrooms succinctly illustrates the defects of the current
Lemon test analysis. Not only must the Court contend with the
lack of a clear principle to apply to establishment clause chal-
lenges, but it must also balance highly sensitive competing
interests. On one hand, public education serves an important
role in training children to be members of a society, where
many consider religion to be an important facet of life.' On
the other hand, great potential for conflict exists when religion
is introduced into a forum with young children who hold di-
verse religious beliefs. Without a clearly articulated and uni-
formly applicable test, the Court's solution has been to exclude
most actions in public schools that involve religion.2"
' See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court
upheld a Nebraska statute that authorized the state to pay chaplains to open each
legislative session with a prayer because the practice of opening sessions of Con-
gress with prayer has continued for almost 200 years. Id. at 792. According to the
Court, to interpret the Establishment Clause in a manner that places more limits
on government than the framers of the Constitution had imposed would be inap-
propriate. Id. at 788.
24 See infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's ratio-
nale for upholding longstanding religious activities without reference to the
activities' compliance with establishment clause principles).
' See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 453 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (noting that "public
schools are vitally important 'in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens,' and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system'") (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
" The Court has said that '[in no activity of the State is it more vital to
keep out divisive forces than in schools." Id. at 854. Mandatory attendance re-
quirements, children's susceptibility to peer pressure, and students' emulation of
teachers as role models all enable school officials to significantly impact a
student's perspective on an issue. Id. These concerns have provided the foundation
for excluding most religious activities from public education. See Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (invalidating a school policy that allowed prayers .at grad-
uation ceremonies); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (invalidating
a statute that mandated the teaching of creation-science when evolution was
taught); Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a "moment of silence"
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An examination of establishment clause decisions will
reveal that the Court has failed in its efforts to define the
parameters of the Establishment Clause correctly. The primary
reason for this failure is the Court's application of the Lemon
test. While the three prongs of the test provide the proper
framework to effectuate the policies underlying the Establish-
ment Clause, the Court improperly applies the test. If properly
applied, the Lemon test would protect the rights of the reli-
gious and nonreligious equally."
statute that specifically stated the time could be used for silent prayer); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a statute that required the posting of
the Ten Commandments in classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(invalidating a statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating a statute that required
recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each day); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating a statute that required recitation of prayer at the
beginning of each school day). But see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding on free speech grounds that the
school district cannot deny churches' request to rent school facilities when other
nonreligious groups use the facilities); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (holding on equal access grounds that students cannot be prohibited from
forming a Bible study group when the school permitted other noncurricular groups
to meet). Although legitimate, the concerns have resulted in the exclusion of reli-
gious activities that present no establishment clause violation.
' Some commentators have suggested that because of the religious beliefs of
the framers, their only concern when drafting the First Amendment was to protect
believers. See, e.g., PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98 (1953); see also John W. Whitehead & Alexis I. Crow,
Beyond Establishment Clause Analysis in Public School Situations: The Need to
Apply the Public Forum and Tinker Doctrines, 28 TULSA L.J. 149, 157 (1992) (dis-
cussing different theories behind formation of Establishment Clause). Professor
Dorsen, however, uses fourteenth amendment principles to demonstrate that the
First Amendment protects nonbelievers as well as believers. Norman Dorsen, The
Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 867 (1986). He
points out that the historical evidence of the Equal Protection Clause does not
speak to the protection of women, aliens or extramarital children, yet the Supreme
Court has held that the amendment demands equal protection for these groups.
Id. Similarly, the "core purpose of the religion clauses applies to nonbelievers as
well as to believers. The key objective . . . is to safeguard minorities and outsiders
with respect to religious beliefs." Id. at 868. Justice Stewart supported this view
in his dissenting opinion in Schempp:
What our Constitution indispensably protects is the freedom of each of
us, be he Jew or Agnostic, Christian or Atheist, Buddhist or Freethinker,
to believe or disbelieve, to worship or not worship, to pray or keep silent,
according to his own conscience, uncoerced and unrestrained by govern-
ment.
374 U.S. at 319-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This view differs from the Court's
current application of the Lemon test, which tends to err in favor of invalidating
statutes that introduce religion into public education. See infra notes 80-105, 116-
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This Note examines the evolution of establishment clause
jurisprudence with particular focus on challenges involving
religion in public education.8 Part I discusses the formation
and interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Part II analyz-
es the Court's current application of the Lemon test and pro-
poses changes to primarily the first and second prong analy-
ses.2 1 Part III evaluates three recent Supreme Court decisions
and criticizes the defects in the Court's analysis. Additionally,
this part applies the proposed changes to the Lemon test as
advocated in Part II and discusses the projected results."
I. BACKGROUND
The Establishment Clause has spawned great debate since
its inception."' Commentators and scholars never have
reached complete agreement on the permissible boundaries of
the clause, particularly in the context of public education. The
historical conditions that led to the clause's ratification, howev-
er, provide guidance for its interpretation and application in
modern society.2
50 (arguing that the Court's current application of the first and second prongs of
the Lemon test renders unconstitutional some conduct that is, in fact, constitution-
al).
. This Note does not address whether religion must be in public schools, but
rather considers whether the Court can constitutionally invalidate legislative deci-
sions that allow religious activities in public schools.
See infra notes 80-188 and accompanying text.
20 There should be greater exposure of religion in public schools for several
reasons. Children who may have an adequate understanding of their own respec-
tive faiths are often ignorant about other faiths. This ignorance can result in reli-
gious tension and fear of difference. Public classrooms, where students with differ-
ent religious beliefs assemble, provide good places to correct this ignorance. More-
over, omitting religion from the curriculum conveys a negative impression of reli-
gion to children. Schools today provide students with broad curricula designed to
instruct them on a variety of issues students confront in daily life. Excluding
religion from schools and relegating it to the home and church conveys that reli-
gion is not useful for resolving life situations. The Establishment Clause does not
mandate this hostility toward religion. In fact, hostility is contrary to the principle
of neutrality. See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 352-53 (1967); see
also Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 939-41
(D.N.J. 1993); infra notes 208-81 and accompanying text.
31 1 ANNAIS OF CONG. 214 (1789); see also infra notes 37, 47.
' The same establishment clause issues of prayer and Bible reading in public
schools that were litigated in the 1820's are still litigated today. See DONALD L.
DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONsTITUTIONAL ISsUEs 85-87 (1991); see also Adler v.
1542 [Vol. 60: 1535
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A. Historical Influences
The idea that government should not promote or foster
religion grew out of the conflict-laden relationship between
government and religion that had existed for centuries in Eu-
rope. European history is marked by conflict between the papa-
cy and reigning monarchs, bloody religious wars that ravaged
the continent, and persecution of religious dissenters.33 De-
spite the desire to prevent this conflict from occurring in Amer-
ica, many of the colonies enacted laws that supported a partic-
ular religion to the exclusion of others. Examples of these es-
tablishments include the Puritans in New England, the Angli-
cans in Virginia, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, and the Catho-
lics in Maryland.34 A resolution passed by the General Court
of Massachusetts in 1641 illustrates the improper union of
government and religion in the early states. The resolution
provided that "[tihe civil authority ... hath power and liberty
to see the peace, ordinances, and rules of Christ observed in
every Church, according to His word.... It is the duty of the
Christian magistrate to take care that the people be fed with
wholesome and sound doctrine."' Although at the time of the
Constitutional Convention some states had begun to separate
Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Gearon v. Loudon
County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993). The fact that the Court has
been unable to establish a coherent standard over the past 170 years highlights
the need for a well-defined standard to apply uniformly to all establishment clause
challenges.
" See generally STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3 (discussing the historical
background of the First Amendment); Theodore Sky, The Establishment Clause,
The Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395
(1966) (discussing the evolution of establishment clause cases with particular atten-
tion on the historical prominence of religion in our society).
" Establishments exist in various forms, but all stem from a governmental
action that symbolizes improper state endorsement of religion. See generally WIL-
LIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49-72 (1964) (detailing which churches
dominated the early states); PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 73-91; H. Frank Way, The
Death of the Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State Relations, 29 J.
CHURCH & STATE 509 (1987).
" PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 73-91. This fusion between government and reli-
gion allowed Massachusetts to limit the voting privilege to members of the Con-
gregationalist church and to banish from the church any person who denied the
fundamental beliefs of the religion. Id. at 75. Moreover, any Quaker who entered
the state was jailed and whipped. Id. at 76.
1995]
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government from religious influences, many still maintained
state-supported churches.36
Although the original Constitution was drafted within this
historical context, the document failed to address the proper
relationship between government and religion. Almost every
state expressed some objection to the absence of restrictions on
the federal government's power to legislate religion." Accord-
ingly, Congress convened on June 8, 1789, to draft the Bill of
Rights. 3 James Madison-often referred to as the 'leading
architect" of the First Amendment-introduced the new
amendments.39 He explained to the legislators that a bill of
rights was necessary to allay the fears of people who believed
that the new government would deprive them of liberties they
recently had won.4" He stated further that he understood the
first amendment religion clauses to mean that "Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observa-
tion of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any man-
ner contrary to their conscience."4'
B. Interpretation
Despite an appreciable contemporary understanding of the
religious oppression that prompted the enactment of the First
Amendment, little consensus exists about how to interpret or
apply the Establishment Clause. Courts often look to legisla-
tive history for guidance in determining the meaning and scope
M' ARNELL, supra note 34, at 109-10.
" PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 125-27. Six states ratified the Constitution but
also proposed amendments for a guarantee of religious liberty. Id. at 125. North
Carolina and Rhode Island would not ratify the Constitution until the adoption of
a bill of rights that included religious freedom and disestablishment. Id.
Many in Congress justified the omission on the ground that such a guarantee
of religious liberty was unnecessary. They argued that absent an express grant of
power to legislate on religion, the federal government could not act in that area
and thus, an express prohibition was unnecessary. The American people, however,
were not satisfied with this argument and made ratification of the Constitution
contingent upon Congress' effort to add a bill of rights to the Constitution. Id.
8 See Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38, 93 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424).
" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968). See generally 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
(1789) (providing a comprehensive summary of the amendments that Madison
introduced).
41 1 MADISON'S WRITINGS 432 (1904).
41 PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 163 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729-31).
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of the clause.42 Discerning the framers' intent, however, is
problematic. The ambiguous historical record readily lends
support to differing interpretations.43 The structure of public
education also has changed so drastically since the drafting of
the clause that the framers' intentions may be inapplicable to
our current educational system." Moreover, the current reli-
gious composition of the United States makes our nation much
more diverse than at any other time in our history.45 Thus,
practices that the framers found unobjectionable could offend
many people in today's society.
4 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the
meaning of the clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings") (quoting Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989));
see also DRAKEMAN, supra note 32, at 53, 96 (stating "[tihe vast majority of the
debates have surrounded the search for the true intent of the First Congress");
PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 161-62 (noting "[tihe versions of the First Amend-
ment . . . are offered as evidence that the intent of the states and of Congress
was only to prevent Congress from establishing a national religion"); Sky, supra
note 33, at 1401-02; Comment, supra note 9, at 80-83.
" See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that "[a] too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers
upon the issues of these cases seems . . . futile and misdirected"); Sky, supra note
33, at 1403 (noting the limitations of a constitutional analysis that attempts to
measure modern judicial results against the "scant, inadequate and poorly reported
record of debates that took place in another age").
" Indeed, the framers of the Bill of Rights may not even have considered the
issue of prayer in public schools because education at that time was largely com-
mitted to church-related schools in which religious exercises were an inherent part
of the curriculum. Sky, supra note 33, at 1403-04.
In Schempp, Justice Brennan provided a detailed description of the evolution
of public education. It was not until the late 1820s and early 1830s that a system
of public education took root in the United States. Over the next 50 years, state
courts were quite deferential to local school boards. For example, when a school
board required religious exercises, a court would uphold that decision. Similarly,
when school boards chose to exclude religious exercises, a court also would support
that decision. With the rise of religious diversity in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, however, courts began to question decisions to include religious
exercises. In light of the clearly religious content and the difficulty of avoiding sec-
tarian controversy, many courts struck down mandatory religious exercises in pub-
lic schools. These changes in the structure of American education indicate that the
framers did not contemplate the fifll scope of religion in public education.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 238.39 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
' Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The framers primarily faced
differences among Christian sects, whereas today our society is much more reli-
giously diverse. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF TBE UNITED STATES (1992) (Table No. 77) (reporting that 79




Despite the inherent problems with a search for the
framers' true collective intent and its subsequent application to
modem situations, history still can serve as a useful guide.
Rather than searching for the framers' intent, a more produc-
tive exercise is to examine the early application of the clause
in the laws the first Congress enacted. These statutes indicate
the types of activities that the framers thought permissible
under the Establishment Clause.46
An early interpretation of the clause suggested that it
required an absolute separation of church and state.4" Indeed,
the first case to consider a challenge to a state action under
the Establishment Clause, Everson v. Board of Education,"
adopted this view.49 Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson
4' Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that history indicates
what the framers intended the clause to do and how it should be interpreted).
When the first Congress permitted an action, it is unlikely that they simulta-
neously intended for the Establishment Clause to later forbid the same actions.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983); Sky, supra note 33, at 1404.
"' Three rationales support separation of church and state. The first is that
separation is required for the protection of churches against the state. See MARK
DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6 (1965); Whitehead & Crow, supra note
27, at 157. The second is that states need to-be protected from undue religious
influence by the church to ensure governmental autonomy. See, e.g., Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); HOWE, supra, at 2. The third rationale is
that the Establishment Clause should protect both institutions equally because
each can best achieve its purposes by operating wholly independent of the other.
See 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAINIES MADISON 487 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); PFEFFER,
supra note 30, at 163. James Madison supported the third view. He believed that
an inevitable result of a union between the two institutions would be that govern-
ment-supported religion would incur hatred, disrespect and contempt by
nonadherents, ultimately destroying government and degrading religion. James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE COM-
PLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 299, 302-305 (Saul K. Padover ed. 1953)
(1785) (hereinafter Memorial and Remonstrance); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1159 (2d ed. 1988).
43 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
' Everson involved a New Jersey statute that had authorized the board of
education to reimburse parents for fares paid for public transportation to public
and nonprofit private schools. Id. at 3-4. The Court held that the statute did not
violate the Establishment Clause, which "erected a wall between church and
state." Id. at 18. The statute in Everson merely provided a general program that
only incidentally benefitted religion. Id.
Justice Souter provided a recent example of reasoning in support of an abso-
lute separation of church and state in Lee v. Weisman. In Lee, Justice Souter
provided a detailed history of the House and Senate debates over the wording of
the Establishment Clause. James Madison's original proposal stated that no na-
tional religion should be established. The adopted version of the Establishment
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most clearly articulated the separation principle and has been
cited consistently by separation advocates.5" He stated that
separation of church and state was intended to create "a com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion."5' He urged that
this separation was necessary to avoid the inevitable conflicts
that arise along religious lines, especially in a pluralistic soci-
ety.5
2
It soon became evident that the Constitution required a
less rigid standard than Justice Rutledge's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. Interactions between government
and religion that had existed contemporaneously with the
drafting of the Constitution supported this accomodation.53
Clause forbids an establishment of religion. Advocates of separation of church and
state argue that the language "an establishment" should be interpreted as forbid-
ding any kind of religious establishment, not just a national church. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. at 2668-70 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
'" All the Justices adopted the separation principle, but Justice Rutledge dis-
sented from the majority's application of the standard. Everson, 330 U.S. at 28.
6 Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Id. at 54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (explaining that governmental involvement
with religion will only "embroil the state" in conflicts between religion and
nonreligion and between different religions); accord Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
431 (1962) (noting that when government attempts to enforce religious beliefs by
legal sanction, people who oppose the laws will naturally find contempt for the
laws, which only diminishes the effectiveness of government); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 215 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that con-
flicts will inevitably arise in a country with a variety of religions whenever gov-
ernment involves itself in religious matters).
Those who support complete separation often view religion as an "unreasoned,
aggressive, exclusionary and divisive force" that must be confined solely to the
private sphere. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660. For example, Justice Black, who was ex-
tremely influential in the early development of establishment clause doctrine, can-
didly criticized religion. During early conflicts between the dominant Protestant
religion and the growing Catholic sect, Justice Black accused Catholics of "looking
toward complete domination and supremacy" of their particular beliefs. Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
More recently, in 1981, the president of Yale University told the entering fresh-
man class that politically active Christians were "peddlers of coercion." See STE-
PHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 58 (1993). And in February 1993, in
a front page story of The Washington Post, Michael Weisskopf referred to religious
people as "largely poor, uneducated, and easy to command." Michael Weisskopf,
Energized by Pulpit or Passion, the Public Is Calling, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993,
at Al.
' Separation proponents are "embarrassed by the many breaches in the wall of
separation countenanced by [the framers]." Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The
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For example, on the same day that Madison proposed his
wording for the First Amendment, Congress re-enacted the
Northwest Territory Ordinance, which provided that religion,
morality and knowledge were necessary for "good government
and the happiness of mankind."' In addition, the day the
House of Representatives adopted the First Amendment, a
resolution passed later that day asked President Washington
to issue a Thanksgiving Day proclamation that would offer an
opportunity to all citizens to give God their sincere thanks for
their many blessings.55
Some of these interactions between government and reli-
gious activities still continue today. For example, branches of
the U.S. armed forces provide chaplains,56 and Congress
opens its daily sessions with prayer.57 Interestingly, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court opens its sessions with "God Save
Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939 (1986).
6 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
I ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1789). Engel provides examples of Presidents who
have officially recognized God. 370 U.S. at 44648 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For
instance, in 1789 President George Washington stated that "it would be peculiarly
improper to omit in this first official act my fervent supplications to that Almighty
Being who rules over the universe." Id. at 446 n.3. In 1809, President Madison
said that "we have all been encouraged to feel in the guardianship and guidance
of that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations . . .and to
whom we are bound to address our devout gratitude for the past, as well as our
fervent supplications and best hopes for the future." Id. at 447. And in 1961, Pres-
ident Kennedy said that "[tihe world is very different now. . . . [aind yet the
same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around
the globe-the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the
state but from the hand of God." Id. at 44849.
3 Stat. 297 (1816).
6' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayers,
which have occurred for over 200 years). Interestingly, Madison, the founding fa-
ther of the First Amendment, was a member of the committee that arranged for
congressional chaplains. No one can assert with intellectual honesty that the First
Amendment intended a complete and utter separation of church and state when
the drafter of the Establishment Clause helped draft legislation that provided
public monies for prayer in Congress. See PFEFFER, supra note 30, at 247.
Until recently, attendance at religous services was mandatory at both the U.S.
military and naval academies. See REGULATIONS FOR THE U.S. CORPS OF CADETS
(1947) ("Each cadet will receive religious training in one of the three principal
faiths: Catholic, Protestant or Jewish."); U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY REG., art. 1503(1)
(providing that midshipmen shall attend church services on Sunday at the Naval
Academy Chapel or at one of the regularly established churches in the city of
Annapolis); see also Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1076 (1972) (finding these mandatory chapel services an unconstitutional
establishment of religion).
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this Honorable Court."58 Thus, throughout history, religion
and government have interacted, with the latter acknowledg-
ing, to a degree, the importance of religion in our society. Even
the Supreme Court has stated that these statutes and resolu-
tions "recognize[ I deeply entrenched and highly cherished
spiritual traditions of our nation."59
Consequently, the Court has rejected a strict separation
principle and replaced it with a neutrality standard. Govern-
mental neutrality dictates that states cannot set up a church,
aid one religion over another, or prefer religious believers to
nonbelievers." Conversely, a generally applicable program
that provides benefits to broad classes without reference to
religion is constitutional even though religious institutions also
receive benefits under the program.6 The Court has been un-
" Kevin T. Baine, Education Litigation: Prospects for Change, 35 CATH. LAW.
283, 285 (1994). Indeed, Chief Justice Burger highlighted the irony in the Supreme
Courts invalidating a moment-of-silence statute when the Court opens its sessions
with a prayer.
Some who trouble to read the opinions in these cases will find it iron-
ic-perhaps even bizarre-that on the very day we heard arguments in
the cases, the Court's session opened with an invocation for Divine pro-
tection. Across the park a few hundred yards away, the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer....
They are given, as they have been since 1789, by clergy appointed as
official chaplains and paid from the Treasury of the United States. Con-
gress has also provided chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where
Members and others may pause for prayer, meditating-or a moment of
silence.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84-85 (1985).
"' Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The Court also pointed out that
"[wie are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a supreme being." Id.
Consequently, the Court concluded that when the state encourages religion it is
following the best of our traditions. Id. at 313-14.
" School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (stating that the Court
has "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only government preference of one religion over another").
"' See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467-68
(1993). A statute that benefits religion is unconstitutional if it creates an incentive
for people to undertake religious education because government then prefers reli-
gion over nonreligion in violation of the Lemon tests second prong. If, however,
the benefit to religion is only incidental to a legitimate secular purpose that bene-
fits a broad class, the statute is constitutional. See, e.g, Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 390 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota statute that granted taxpayers a tax de-
duction for expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks and transportation for
their children's attendance at both public and private elementary and secondary
schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding a New Jer-
sey statute that reimbursed costs of public transportation to public and nonprofit
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
able, however, to define clearly what actions, beyond generally
applicable programs, comport with the Establishment Clause.
II. THE LEMON TEST: CURRENT APPLICATION & PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE
In an attempt to clarify establishment clause standards,
the Court promulgated the Lemon test in 1971.62 Courts uti-
lize the three-prong test to determine when a governmental
action violates the Establishment Clause. The test requires
that the statute have a secular purpose, that its principal or
primary effect be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, and that the statute not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion. 3 Despite the longstanding existence of the Lem-
on test, inconsistent results have prompted calls for its abolish-
ment or modification.' Critics of the test argue that it has no
foundation in the First Amendment and has produced such
inconsistent results that one can only guess what statutes will
private schools).
' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved a challenge to a
Pennsylvania program that reimbursed private schools for teacher's salaries, books
and materials used in certain secular subjects, and a Rhode Island program that
granted a 15% salary supplement to teachers in private schools. The Court invali-
dated both programs. Id. at 625.
' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted). This tripartite test combined
the "purpose" and "primary effect" tests used in School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S 203 (1963), with the "excessive entanglement" test of Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). In applying these tests to the facts in Lemon, the
Court concluded that the statutes had the secular legislative purpose of fostering
high-quality secular education. The complicated statutory precautions designed to
ensure that the effect of the statutes would not advance religion, however, created
an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
" Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 164-65 (1992) (criticizing the Lemon test as vague, producing inconsis-
tent results and that are simply incorrect). One alternative approach is a single
test for both establishment clause and free exercise clause challenges. This test
would require a statute to be facially neutral, so that it would not single out reli-
gion or a particular religion for favorable or unfavorable treatment. Id. at 165;
Phillip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 24 (1978). Another
suggested test would invalidate a statute only if it lacked a legitimate secular pur-
pose and was "likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising or
influencing religious beliefs." Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673, 675 (1980); see also
supra note 16 (detailing criticism of the Lemon test by the Supreme Court Justic-
es).
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be held unconstitutional. Even the Supreme Court has charac-
terized the test as no more than a "helpful signpost" in detect-
ing constitutional violations.65
A summary of Supreme Court decisions illuminates the
magnitude of this problem. For example, the Court has held it
constitutional for a state to hire a Presbyterian minister to
lead the legislature in daily prayers,6 but unconstitutional for
a state to set aside a moment of silence in public schools with
prayer designated as an acceptable use of that time.67 The
Court also has held it unconstitutional for a state to require
employers to accommodate their employees' work schedules to
allow for sabbath observances,68 but constitutional for a state
to require employers to pay unemployment benefits when the
employee is discharged for refusing to work on the sabbath.69
In addition, government may give money to religiously affili-
ated organizations, among others, to teach adolescents about
proper sexual behavior,7 ° but not to teach them about history
or science.71 The government also can provide religious school
students with books,72 but not maps,73 and with bus rides to
" Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
" Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1983).
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56; see infra notes 209-21 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Wallace decision).
"' Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) (finding that
a Connecticut statute that provided Sabbath observers with an absolute right not
to work on their Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause where it imposes on
employers the absolute duty to conform their business practices to particular reli-
gious practices of employees).
" Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (find-
ing that Illinois's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a worker who
refused employment because the job would have required him to work on Sundays
violated the Free Exercise Clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963)
(determining that termination of unemployment benefits because of employee's re-
fusal to accept employment that would have required her to work on Saturdays,
constituted a violation of the Free Exercise Clause).
" Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611 (1988). The Supreme Court held that
the Adolescent Family Life Act did not have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion, even though the Act provided for grants to religious and other organizations
that offer counseling on teenage sexuality without expressly requiring that the
funds be used for religious purposes.
7 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971); see supra note 62 (discuss-
ing facts of Lemon).
2 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (holding that a New York
statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to
all students in grades seven through 12 was not a law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof simply because it autho-
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religious schools, 4 but not from a religious school to a muse-
um as part of a field trip." Finally, government can pay for
state-mandated tests administered in religious schools,7 but
cannot pay for safety-related maintenance of the school build-
ings.
An erroneously applied Lemon test generates these incon-
sistent results. Not only does the Court improperly apply the
test, but it fails to be consistent in its misapplication. While
limitations must be placed upon the interaction between reli-
gion and government to ensure compliance with the Constitu-
tion, current attempts to curtail establishment clause viola-
tions yield both unpredictable and over-restrictive results.78
rized the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools).
" Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-51 (1977) (holding that loaning auxilia-
ry equipment like maps was unconstitutional because they could be used in a way
that conveyed the parochial school's religious doctrine).
"' Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947); see supra note 49 (discuss-
ing facts of Everson).
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
' Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-
54 (1980) (determining that a New York statute, which appropriated public funds
to reimburse both church-sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for performing
various services mandated by the state, including the administration, grading and
reporting of the results of state-prepared tests, had the secular purpose of provid-
ing educational opportunity of a quality that will prepare students for participation
in society).
' Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-
80 (1973). In Nyquist, the Court held that a tuition reimbursement statute that
provided income tax benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools
violated the Establishment Clause. Notwithstanding that the tuition grants were
given as reimbursement for tuition already paid and that recipients were not re-
quired to spend the money on education, the Court pointed out that the system
was not sufficiently restricted to assure that it would not have an impermissible
effect of advancing religion.
" Stephen L. Carter, Professor of Law at Yale University, addresses the need
for a clear test to apply uniformly to all establishment clause challenges while ac-
knowledging the difficulty of the task. In his recent book, The Culture of Disbelief,
he notes:
We are trying, here in America, to strike an awkward but necessary
balance, one that seems more and more difficult with each passing year.
On the one hand, a magnificent respect for freedom of conscience, includ-
ing the freedom of religious belief, runs deep in our political ideology. On
the other hand, our understandable fear of religious domination of politics
presses us, in our public personas, to be wary of those who take their
religion too seriously.... We are one of the most religious nations on
earth, in the sense that we have a deeply religious citizenry; but we are
also perhaps the most zealous in guarding our public institutions against
explicit religious influences. One result is that we often ask our citizens
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There can be little doubt that this consequence is a primary
reason why the same issues are litigated year after year.79
to split their public and private selves, telling them in effect that it is
fine to be religious in private, but there is something askew when those
private beliefs become the basis for public action.
The problem goes well beyond our society's treatment of those who
simply want freedom to worship in ways that most Americans find trou-
bling. An analogous difficulty is posed by those whose religious convic-
tions move them to action in the public arena. Too often, our rhetoric
treats the religious impulse to public action as presumptively wick-
ed-indeed, as necessarily oppressive....
... The First Amendment guarantees the "free exercise" of religion but
also prohibits its 'establishment" by the government. There may have
been times in our history when we as a nation have tilted too far in one
direction, allowing too much religious sway over politics. But in late
twentieth-century America, despite some loud fears about the influence of
the weak and divided Christian right, we are upsetting the balance
afresh by tilting too far in the other direction-and the courts are as-
sisting in the effort.
CARTER, supra note 52, at 8-11.
" The December holiday seasons are a good example of the type of problems
caused by the lack of clear establishment clause principles. See Kimberly J.
McLarin, Holiday Dilemma at Schools: Is That a Legal Decoration?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1993, at Al.
Pity the public school principle in December. Between Hanukkah,
Christmas and Kwanzaa, this long last month lays a minefield of grand
proportions for educators trying to acknowledge the holidays without
bridging the separation of church and state.
Between parents who want their religion in the schools, parents who
want less of some other religion in the schools and parents who want no
religion at all in the schools, school officials in the New York region
know that come December, their phones will be jingling.
Two years ago, officials in Voorhees, N.J., decided they needed a
policy to guide them through the holiday season .... [A district spokes-
person said,] "We were to the point where people were objecting to red
and green sprinkled on cookies . .. ."
Id.; see also Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 870 F. Supp.
1450 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (challenging private placement of menorah in lobby of city
building after the city erected a Christmas tree in the lobby); Chabad-Lubavitch v.
Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (challenging display of menorah in state capi-
tol rotunda).
Whether prayers should be allowed at graduation ceremonies is another issue
that is re-litigated yearly. See, e.g., Goluba v. School Dist. No. 94-2010, 1995 WL
8235 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th
Cir. 1994); Friedman v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir.




A. Lemon's First Prong
1. Current Application
The first prong of the Lemon test requires a legitimate
secular purpose for the statute."0 This prong strives to ensure
that the legislative process does not become the machinery by
which local churches effectuate their policies.81 Religious
groups should be able to lobby, however, for their respective
causes on the same footing as other interest groups.8 2 A limi-
tation upon the state is that there must be a legitimate secular
purpose-one that serves legitimate state interests-for enact-
ing the statute.' This requirement acts as a constitutional
check on the relationship between religion and government,
and ensures that the two do not combine in the oppressive
manner that had existed for centuries in Europe and, to a
limited degree, in colonial America.
Several flaws mar the Court's current first-prong analysis.
First, the Court consistently merges together the analyses of
the first and second prongs of the Lemon test. An inquiry
into the statute's effect of either advancing or inhibiting reli-
gion is proper under the second prong, but irrelevant to the
first. The Court, however, frequently considers a statute's
effect when it determines whether the legislature had a secular
purpose for enacting the statute under the first prong. For
example, in Stone v. Graham,85 the Court invalidated a Ken-
tucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Command-
ments in each public school classroom. 6 To reach the conclu-
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
81 Id. at 621.
Although religious groups should be entitled to petition the government in
the same manner as other interest groups, some argue that religion should be a
factor solely for private life and consequently should be banned from the political
arena entirely. See CARTER, supra note 52, at 113 (discussing attempts to preclude
religion from the public sphere).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
See infra notes 113-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second
prong of Lemon.
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
The displays were purchased with private funds and contained a notation on
each display that "the secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly
seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
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sion that the statute lacked a legitimate secular purpose, the
Court analyzed the statute's effect.8' Because the statute had
the effect of advancing religion and was "plainly religious in
nature," the Court held that the statute lacked a legitimate
secular purpose.' Thus, the Court relied on the statute's ef-
fect to determine that it lacked a legitimate secular purpose.
The Court's analysis in Stone effectively rendered the first
prong irrelevant. The Court used the same factors to deem a
statute unconstitutional under the second prong of the Lemon
test as it did to find the lack of a legitimate secular purpose
required by the first prong.89 The Court did not perform a
separate analysis of the legitimate secular purpose articulated
by the legislators." Thus, despite the Supreme Court's articu-
lation of a three-prong test in Lemon, geared to address three
separate concerns,9' the Court frequently has failed to
perform three independent inquiries.92 Although the Court's
current Lemon test analysis deems some constitutional stat-
utes unconstitutional, when the first two prongs are merged
into one, the opposite and equally incorrect result occurs. A
statute without the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion
could have been enacted solely for religious purposes. Such a
statute fails Lemon's first prong and, as such, is unconstitu-
tional. Without an independent inquiry into a statute's pur-
Common Law of the United States." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
' Id. at 42. The Court stated that "[i]f the posted copies of the Ten Command-
ments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the school children to
read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments." Id. (em-
phasis added).
"Id. at 41.
To determine whether the statute satisfied the first prong of Lemon, the
Court looked at the statute's effect on students. The Court did not proceed to
perform a second-prong inquiry, but if it had, presumably it would then have
asked again, what effect the statute had on students. Thus, the Court merged the
first and second prong so that both prongs relied on the same inquiry. See infra
notes 168-80 and accompanying text (discussing the proper second-prong inquiry).
" See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
" See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("In the absence of pre-
cisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the
three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection .... Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.").
2 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (not explicitly
addressing any of Lemon's prongs); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (merging
the first and second prongs); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (failing to
use the Lemon test).
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pose, an unconstitutional statute could withstand judicial scru-
tiny. While it is probably rare that a statute enacted solely to
support religion would not have the effect of aiding that reli-
gion, the possibility of this type of unconstitutional establish-
ment is just what the first prong was designed to detect.
Furthermore, when the Court has performed a first-prong
inquiry, it has persistently scrutinized legislators' motivations
for supporting a statute.93 Thus, even when a statute may
have served a legitimate secular purpose, the Court has invali-
dated it when legislators had religious motivations for support-
ing it. 94 Establishment clause decisions based solely on
legislators' personal motivations present several concerns.
First, reliance on personal motivations to invalidate state
actions allows the Court to ignore the inherent difficulties of
an inquiry into subjective beliefs. The Court can determine
objectively whether a statute serves a legitimate secular pur-
pose, but to determine legislators' subjective motivation for
enacting a statute is nearly an impossible task. Legislators
may have numerous motivations for supporting a given stat-
ute.9" In fact, it is inherent in our pluralistic society that a
multitude of factors motivate the enactment of any legisla-
tion.96 What motivates one legislator to make a speech on the
' The Supreme Court discusses its decision-making process for its first-prong
determination in relatively few cases. When it has explained its decision, personal
motivations of legislators were afforded great weight in the Court's decision. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S.
38, 56 (1985). See generally Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
'" Some commentators are concerned that nonbelievers will be excluded from
meaningful participation in the political process if legislators are allowed to ex-
press religious reasons for supporting legislation. See Abner S. Greene, The Politi-
cal Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615 (1993). Religious
arguments allegedly exclude nonbelievers from full participation in the process and
thus should not be the sole basis for enacting legislation. Id. at 1619-23. But this
argument ignores the fact that the political process should be open to all ideas
and ideologies. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
" Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also DRAKEMAN, supra
note 32, at 106-07. Drakeman points out that it is quite difficult to ascertain the
purpose behind a law when the law has been enacted by a few hundred members
of a state legislature and then signed by a governor. Even if all of these people
were in agreement as to the statute's meaning, they certainly had a multitude of
purposes for supporting the statute. Moreover, the Court's decisions have made it
unclear whether the entire legislature must have an improper motivation to invali-
date a statute or if the motives of one legislator is sufficient. Id. If the latter case
is true, then it is incongruous that one legislator cannot enact a statute by her
vote alone, but can bring down a statute merely by her statement. Id.
" See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 451 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
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House floor may not motivate others to vote in favor of a stat-
ute. Furthermore, a single legislator may have many reasons
for supporting a piece of legislation.97
In addition to this difficult subjective analysis, the Court
has not indicated how many legislators must adopt the improp-
er legislative motivation to render the statute unconstitutional.
Thus, the intent of one legislator might counter or taint the
proper motives of all others and thereby invalidate an other-
wise constitutional statute. 8 Professor Stephen L. Carter apt-
ly explains the inappropriateness of this analysis:
A rule holding that the religious convictions of the proponents are
enough to render a statute constitutionally suspect represents a
sweeping rejection of the deepest beliefs of millions of Ameri-
cans.... In a nation that prides itself on cherishing religious free-
dom, it would be something of a puzzle to conclude that the Estab-
lishment Clause means that a Communist or a Republican may try
to have his or her world view reflected in the nation's law, but a
religionist can not.... [lif the courts continue to read Lemon as
they have, the Establishment Clause might well end up not
antiestablishment but antireligion.'
The Establishment Clause cannot mean that all views other
than religious beliefs are entitled to representation and free
discourse in the legislative process.'
(stating that "where the law or policy under review is the result of an institution-
al process, such as a vote of a multi-member legislature, . . . . [t]he individual,
and quite possibly varied, purposes or intentions of the several operative decision
makers .. . would have little or no probative value").
" Greene, supra note 94, at 1624 (noting that "[miany laws will be expressly
based not on a single religious or secular purpose, but on an intertwined set of
purposes").
" Edwards, 482 U.S. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia discussed
three arguments against relying on individual legislators' motives to invalidate a
statute. First, determining subjective motivations is extremely difficult: "[wihat
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what
motivates scores of others to enact it." Id. at 637. Second, there are no limitations
on the scope of statements considered to detect an improper motive. Should all
statements ever made on the subject be considered? Third, "is it possible that the
intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate [the statute]-on a theory,
perhaps, that even though everyone else's intent was pure, what they produced
was the fruit of a forbidden tree?." Id. at 638.
CARTER, supra note 52, at 113.
100 Justice Brandeis stated that:
Those who won our independence . . . believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage .... They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
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The second problem with a constitutional determination
based on personal motivations is that it fails to grant sufficient
deference to legislative decisions. The Court, when determining
the constitutionality of a state legislature's act, should "have
'due regard to the fact that th[e] Court is not exercising a pri-
mary judgment but sitting in judgment upon those who also
and spread of political truth; that without speech and assembly discus-
sion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily ade-
quate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (concluding that "[tlo permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for
each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought");
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open"). In light of the im-
portance placed upon freedom of speech and upon the free exercise of religion, the
Constitution should not be interpreted in a manner that permits all but religious
views to be represented in government.
A tangential issue is the right to free exercise of one's religious beliefs. The
effect of the Court's current analysis is that if legislators freely express religious
motivations, then otherwise constitutional statutes could be deemed unconstitution-
al. This consequence would seem to deter legislators from debating all issues in an
open and uninhibited manner. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) the
Court held that state action that burdens the free exercise of religion, as would a
political process that precludes public expression of religious beliefs, may be up-
held only if the law is justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by
less-restrictive means. Seventeen years later, however, the Court lowered the stan-
dard in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), to allow the state to
infringe upon the free exercise of one's religion when the statute is substantially
related to a significant governmental interest.
In November 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, which restored the Sherbert standard. Thus, a state statute that burdens
free exercise of religion must have a compelling state interest, which cannot be
served by less restrictive means. H.R.J. REs. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). It
is uncertain, however, whether Congress has the constitutional authority to estab-
lish a standard for the federal courts to follow in deciding free exercise challenges.
For an interesting discussion of the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits,
79 VA. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing the implications of congressional attempts to
legislate constitutional norms); Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court
Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1993) (concluding
that as a matter of precedent and constitutional structure, Congress' power under
the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is very broad and that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is well within that power); see also Rodney
J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the
First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 396 n.400 (1994).
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have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have
the responsibility for carrying on government."' 1° State legis-
lators and school boards, acting pursuant to state statutes,
should be granted deference and should have their decisions
invalidated only when they clearly violate the Constitution. 2
The Court, however, has ignored this principle, and continually
has questioned legislators' motives when statutes are chal-
lenged under the Establishment Clause regardless of whether
the legislature clearly has articulated a legitimate secular
purpose.
1 0 3
In addition to the constitutional defects of a test that pro-
hibits religious motivations for supporting legislation, this
analysis ignores the historical importance of religion in our
society. Inevitably, government and religion will "intersect,
conflict and combine." ' 4 For example, if legislators' personal
motivations will render a statute unconstitutional, states could
not criminalize murder, theft or place restrictions on abortion
because it is likely that at least one legislator would support
such statutes based oa religious beliefs. Thus, a proper first-
prong analysis would recognize that legislators will be motivat-
ed by religious beliefs, and attempt only to ensure that stat-
utes are enacted for legitimate secular purposes.' 5
2. Proposed First Prong
To determine whether a statute satisfies Lemon's first
prong, the Court should perform a two-part inquiry. The Court
should determine first whether the legislature had a legitimate
"' Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951)).
"02 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 695 (Powell, J., concurring) ("States and locally elected
school boards should have the responsibility for determining the educational policy
of the public schools."). An establishment clause challenge to the subject matter
taught in public schools should be interfered with only when the purpose for the
school's decision is "clearly religious." Id.
1 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2488-89 (1994); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
56-60 & nn.43, 45 (1985).
104 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101 See Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Establishment Clause is not violated simply be-




secular purpose for enacting the statute and, second, whether
the statute furthers that purpose. The Court's analysis would
entail, for example, reading the preamble and text of the stat-
ute and looking to legislative history to determine what prob-
lem the statute sought to remedy."6 If this inquiry reveals a
legitimate secular purpose for the statute's enactment, the
Court must then determine whether the statute could serve
that purpose."°7 This analysis should not be confused with
Lemon's second-prong inquiry into the effects of the statute.
The focus here should be whether the statute could serve the
legitimate state interest, not whether it actually does serve the
interest. For example, one legislative purpose for including
creationism in the science curriculum might be to ensure aca-
demic freedom.0° A statute that includes creationism in the
science curriculum while excluding evolution, however, would
not serve the legitimate secular purpose of academic free-
dom. 0 9
One common criticism of a first-prong inquiry that ignores
consideration of personal motivations is that religion should be
"' The Court performs this inquiry in other areas of the law. See, e.g., Busi-
ness Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 498 U.S. 533, 540-41
(1991) (looking to the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine
the meaning of Rule 11 and finding that nothing in the text detracted from the
plain meaning of the rule); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429 (1981) (ex-
plaining that to determine the meaning of "offer" and "sale" of § 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Exchange Act, the Court begins its inquiry by looking to the language
of the Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (addressing the
question of whether scienter is required to establish a § 10b-5 violation of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, the Court first turned to the language of § 10(b)
because "the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
language itself').
10 This analysis is different from the current inquiry because it focuses on
objective legislative materials and the political process rather than on individual
beliefs. Thus, the modified first-prong analysis requires a legitimate secular pur-
pose for the statute, and the second part of the inquiry focuses on whether the
statute serves the legitimate secular purpose.
' See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the academic freedom argument in Edwards v. Aguillard).
"' This statute would not further academic freedom because it precludes stu-
dents from exposure to a widely accepted scientific theory on the origins of man.
Arguably, a school does not have to include any reference to the origins of human-
kind in its science curriculum. If it chooses to include evolution, then academic
freedom is furthered by including creationism. It would be difficult, however, to
convince a court that a statute that allowed teachers to teach only creationism did
not serve a religious purpose.
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excluded from the political process.1 Commentators express
concern that religious groups with a broad political base will
utilize the political machinery to further their interests to the
detriment of minority groups' interests."' The second prong,
however, would prevent this result. Under the revised second
prong, a statute that advances religion would be unconstitu-
tional irrespective of whether the religious belief is held by a
majority or minority group. Thus, a statute that serves a legiti-
mate secular purpose will be unconstitutional only if it
impermissibly advances religion. If, however, the statute
serves a legitimate secular purpose and does not impermissibly
advance religion, then the personal beliefs of the legislators
will not render a statute unconstitutional."2 Lemon's first
1. See supra note 94.
. Politicization of religious issues is a legitimate concern because our political
process is a majoritarian system. Every issue before Congress, however, is subject
to this abuse. Thus, the concern that majority religions will use the political ma-
chinery to the detriment of minority religions should not lead to the exclusion of
religion from the political process. Many unpopular views are allowed to compete
in the political process, and so should religion. Professor Carter points out that it
"would be something of a puzzle to conclude that the Establishment Clause means
that a Communist or a Republican may try to have his or her world view reflect-
ed in the nation's law, but a religionist cannot." CARTER, supra note 52, at 113.
There are checks to preclude abuse of the system. For example, the amend-
ments to the Constitution specifically preclude legislatures from enacting certain
laws. With regard to religion, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses serve
this purpose. The Lemon test, however, needs to be applied correctly to act as a
check on religion in the public sphere, without unconstitutionally excluding the
free exercise of religion. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 195, 197 n.5 (1992) (explaining that "an articulable secular rationale
is all that is required; a requirement of a secular motivation trenches too far on
the freedoms of conscience and expression of citizens and legislators"); see also
Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 994 (1989) (arguing that the overturning of laws
because the legislators who enacted them expressed religious purposes "raises a
potentially serious threat to the freedom of expression of legislators who hold
religious beliefs").
U' Assuming that the third Lemon prong is not violated, there are four possible
outcomes for statutes challenged under the Establishment Clause. The statute
could: (1) lack a legitimate secular purpose and advance or inhibit religion; (2)
lack a legitimate secular purpose but not advance or inhibit religion; (3) have a
legitimate secular purpose but advance or inhibit religion; or (4) have a legitimate
secular purpose but not advance or inhibit religion. Only the fourth fact pattern is
constitutional. Cf. Smith, supra note 111, at 994 and Sullivan, supra note 111, at
197 n.5 (discussing First Amendment guarantees that prevent an analysis of
legislators' personal motivations for enacting a statute).
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and second prongs, when properly applied, have the ability to
protect minority religious groups from a majoritarian demo-
cratic process without rendering public expressions of religion
taboo.
B. Lemon's Second Prong
1. Current Application
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the pri-
mary effect of a statute be neither to advance nor to inhibit
religion." Governmental neutrality dictates that government
neither favor one religion over another nor prefer religion over
nonreligion."' The First Amendment itself provides the ratio-
nale behind the second prong of the Lemon test: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."'
1 5
When a state or federal government passes legislation that
either advances one religion over another, or prefers religion
over nonreligion, this moves toward the type of religious op-
pression that prompted enactment of the First Amendment.
People should be as free to express their religious beliefs in the
public sphere as they are free from compulsory adherence to
religion.
The Court has developed two subtests to determine wheth-
er a statute comports with this requirement. In some cases the
Court simultaneously uses both subtests, while in other cases
it applies none. These subtests are overinclusive in their appli-
cation, often detecting a constitutional violation when none is
actually present. Thus, these tests fail to strike the proper
balance between freedom of religious expression and the Es-
tablishment Clause.
a. The Coercion Test
The First Amendment guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion." 6 In
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
1 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
.. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
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1834, James Madison interpreted this guarantee to mean that
"Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience."11 He feared that "one
sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to con-
form."118 "[A]ttempts to enforce [religious adherence] by legal
sanctions" would only "tend to enervate the laws in gener-
al.""' When government and religion had united, the result
was the creation of laws that mandated church attendance,
compelled donations to religious institutions, and required
Bible reading in public schools.12 Those who chose to violate
these rules faced criminal as well as civil sanctions. 2' Madi-
son envisioned a First Amendment that prohibited this type of
coerced religious adherence."
Madison's interpretation of the First Amendment prevailed
in establishment clause decisions through the mid-1900s. In
1940, the Court paraphrased the Establishment Clause as
"forestal[ling] compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship.""s The presence or
lack of compulsion were central to the Court's later decisions
in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education2 4 and
Zorach v. Clauson.'" In 1961, the Court explained that the
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)) (noting that "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a inimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes
a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so").
117 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1834).
" Id. at 731.
. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 44, at 304.
"o For a detailed discussion of unconstitutional relationships, see generally
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHiENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1986). See also supra notes 9-10.
"' Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the type of coer-
cion present in the historical establishment of religion was coerced religious belief
and financial support "by force of law and threat of penalty").
12 Madison argued that states should prevent religion from being "armed with
the sanctions of a law" because religion should not be directed by "force or vio-
lence." Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 299.
12 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
,24 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating a release-time program that provided reli-
gious instruction on public school property).
'2 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release-time programs that provided religious
instruction on private property).
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distinction between the constitutional Sunday closing laws and
the unconstitutional release-time program in McCollum was
that the closing laws did not compel religious participation.126
Typical of the Court's ambivalence in this area, one year later,
it stated that "[t]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."12'
The Court failed to explain its sudden departure from a coer-
cion analysis.
Recently, the Court once again has adopted a coercion
analysis in establishment clause cases but has expanded the
definition of what constitutes a coercive activity. In fact, the
Court currently prohibits actions that present none of the orig-
inal Establishment Clause concerns, but contain the mere
possibility of a subjective feeling of coercion." This subjec-
tive feeling of coercion is established simply by demonstrating
that people exposed to the religious activity dislike it.'29
The Court's current coercion standard favors those who
oppose the presence of religion in the public sphere over those
who support it and is contrary to the principle of neutrality
that the Establishment Clause mandates.'30 For example, in
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,'31 parents of
children in the public schools claimed that particular textbooks
denigrated their religion.3" The parents asked that their chil-
" McGowan- v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-53 (1961) ("In McCollum tax-sup-
ported buildings were used to aid religion; in the instant case, no tax monies are
being used in aid of religion.").
" , Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (invalidating a New York statute
that required recitation of prayer every morning in the public schools). See gener-
ally McConnell, supra note 53, at 934-36 (criticizing the basis for the proposition
as adopted in Engel for its lack of precedent, explanation or relevance to the case
at bar).
'" See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) (finding graduation
prayers coercive solely because the dissenter had a "reasonable perception that she
[was] being forced" to conform). There was no showing in Lee, however, that any-
one was coerced to participate in the graduation prayer. Id. at 2653. Thus, al-
though no actual coercion existed, the Court invalidated the action.
' McConnell, supra note 64, at 152-53.
Io See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
m 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
2 Id. at 1060-61.
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dren be permitted to use substitute texts.'33 The Sixth Circuit
rejected the claim on the ground that enforced exposure to
contrary views does not violate the Free Exercise Clause."
According to the Sixth Circuit, "[w]hat is absent from this case
is the critical element of compulsion to affirm or deny a reli-
gious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in a practice
forbidden or required in the exercise of plaintiffs religion."135
Thus, a religious person objecting to state conduct was re-
quired to show actual compulsion.
In sharp contrast to this interpretation of coercion are the
nativity scene cases.136 In these cases, the Court has recog-
nized a constitutional claim for unwilling exposure to a govern-
ment message supporting another religion, even if the claimant
easily could have avoided the exposure. Consequently, the
Court's coercion analysis has established a standard where
compelled exposure to governmental messages denigrating
one's religion is constitutional, while avoidable exposure to
governmental messages favorable to another religion is
not."'37 Since nearly all incidents of religion in the public
sphere, particularly in public education, will elicit some objec-
tion, the effect of the Court's analysis is to remove nearly all
such activities. Whether or not citizens prefer that religion be
3 Id. at 1060.
"' Id. at 1065 (emphasizing that plaintiffs sole objection was to the children's
exposure to the challenged material).
r Id. at 1069.
'6 See, e.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
M7 cConnell, supra note 64, at 152-53; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678-79 (1984). Currently, claims based on religious objections must involve a
burden on the free exercise of religion, while claims under the Establishment
Clause succeed merely because the plaintiff dislikes the religious activity or dis-
play. Compare Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987) (rejecting claim by students that public school textbooks denigrated their
religion) with Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (finding creche display unconstitutional).
Some argue that this outcome is justified because religious people are free to wor-
ship in their homes and churches and consequently government should not have to
accommodate their religious beliefs in the public sphere. This outcome, however,
violates the neutrality standard. Religious people are exposed to state laws and
displays that offend their beliefs, yet those statutes are deemed constitutional.
Accordingly, the nonreligious should realize that occasionally they may be exposed
to religious displays and activities that they dislike. See McConnell, supra note 64,
at 158-59 (stating that the same coercion standard for both the Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause would restore the symmetry between the religion
clauses that was broken when the Court declared coercion was an element of a
successful Free Exercise claim while not for an Establishment Clause).
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included or excluded from public education, the Constitution
does not mandate this result. The Constitution simply requires
that government not compel religious adherence."'e
b. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor suggests that, to determine whether a
statute advances or inhibits religion, the Court must ask
whether the action has the effect of endorsing religion.139 Un-
der this test, the central question is whether an objective ob-
server, acquainted with the text, legislative history and im-
plementation of the statute, would perceive the statute as a
state endorsement of religion. According to Justice O'Connor,
an endorsement of religion sends a "message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political com-
munity, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, and favored members of the political communi-
ty." '4 Any governmental action that appears to make adher-
ence to religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the community is prohibited."' According to Justice
O'Connor, the Lemon test's second prong prohibits state en-
dorsement of religion because state endorsement normally
involves an inherent pressure to conform to a particular reli-
gion. 14 2
Vital to the application of the endorsement test is an un-
derstanding of who is the objective observer. This factor ren-
ders the endorsement test inappropriate for determining an
establishment clause violation. The diversity of beliefs concern-
" Another problem with the renewed application of the coercion test is that
courts are unsure whether the coercion test is part of the Lemon test, or whether
it is a separate test to be applied instead of the Lemon test or in addition to the
Lemon test. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 450 (M.D. Fla.
1994); see also Brook Millard, Note, Lee v. Weisman and the Majoritarian Implica-
tions of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 71 DENy. U. L. REV. 759 (1994).
" Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Justice Brennan expressed that when the "power, prestige and financial sup-
port of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coer-
cive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially ap-
proved religion is plain." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
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ing religion in this country makes it difficult to define an objec-
tive observer.' One who agrees with a state-supported reli-
gious activity may simply interpret an action as an accommo-
dation of his or her beliefs, whereas one who opposes the activ-
ity may interpret the government action as an endorsement of
religion contrary to his or her own beliefs.'44 An objective
standard is difficult to establish when both the adherent and
nonadherent are naturally biased-the adherent in favor of the
state action and the nonadherent against the state action. 145
Justice O'Connor, however, attempts to define the objec-
tive observer by focusing on how an objective nonadherent
perceives the situation.46 Thus, Justice O'Connor's objective
observer is actually an objective nonadherent. If a nonadherent
would perceive the governmental action as an endorsement of
religion, then the action violates the second prong of the Lem-
on test.1
47
m See supra note 45.
" See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concur-
ring). Justice Souter explained that accommodation of religious beliefs merely dem-
onstrates respect for the other's religion, it is not a state endorsement. The ma-
jority in Lee, however, did not accept this argument and viewed the prayers as
forcing students to participate. Id. at 2681-82.
14. Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, with its reliance on an objective observ-
er analysis, is highly individualistic and subject to manipulation. According to this
test, a government action is an establishment because it is perceived as such. See
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630, 632 (1989). A test that relies upon
who is interpreting the action is particularly troublesome in our pluralistic culture.
For example, whether a parochial aid program endorses religion depends upon
whether the observer views the aid as supporting religious education or as a pro-
gram designed to equalize the treatment of parents and students who desire a
religious education with those who prefer a secular education. See Marshall, supra
note 17, at 533-34.
14' See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 634 (finding that a menorah standing
alone in front of the government building may well send a message of en-
dorsement to "nonadherents"); see also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (allowing a student-run Bible study group to meet on school property). In
Mergens, the Board of Education argued that allowing the group to meet would
send a message to the students that the school was endorsing the group. Id. at
228. The Court disagreed, stating that since the school could take measures to
ensure that students did not perceive endorsement, such as specifically communi-
cating to the student body that the group was not officially endorsed, there was
no establishment clause violation. Id. at 251.
147 Under this analysis, a creche surrounded by secular symbols of the
Christmas holiday, such as Santa Claus, reindeer and candy canes, would not send
an endorsement of religion message, but endorsement of a national holiday. Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). A creche surrounded by a white fence and
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Justice Kennedy has pointed out correctly that the prima-
ry flaw in Justice O'Connor's analysis is its focus on the minor-
ity or majority status of religion."' Thus, a state action that
favors a minority religion does not send a message of endorse-
ment, but one of supporting pluralism. For example, if a leg-
islature in a predominantly Judeo-Christian community enacts
a law that benefits a minority religion, the statute will be
deemed constitutional because the nonadherent is the majority
group. If, however, that same legislature enacts a statute that
benefits the majority religious belief, then the nonadherent, a
member of a minority religion, may perceive the action as an
unconstitutional endorsement of a majority faith."' This ana-
lysis is inherently biased against the majority religion. The
difficulties with the application of the objective observer stan-
dard are magnified in challenges to religion in public educa-
tion, since the affected objective observers "are by reason of
age, barely able of objectivity."5 '
flowers which do not detract an observers attention away from the religious mes-
sage of the display, however, is considered an endorsement of religion. Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 598-99.
Professor Tribe explains that the reasonable non-adherent is "not 'hypersensi-
tive,' but may be, because of her position as an outsider, offended by actions that
'may seem so natural and proper to adherents as to blur into the background
noise of society.'" TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1293.
14 Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 677 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (writing that a reasonable nonadherent standard naturally
turns on the minority status of the observer).
" For example, in Allegheny, the Court upheld the combined display of a me-
norah and Christmas tree because it sent a message of pluralism. In the same
case, however, the Court invalidated the city's creche display because it sent a
message to minority religions that government supported the Christian faith.
Justice Kennedy correctly summarized the Court's application of the endorse-
ment test: "[t]hose religions enjoying the largest following must be consigned to
the status of least favored faiths so as to avoid any possible risk of offending
members of minority religions." Id. at 677. Accordingly, under the endorsement
test, the Judeo-Christian faiths could not successfully challenge religious displays
because they enjoy majority status in our society and could not possibly perceive
the government as endorsing a different belief.
"l Age has been considered a relevant factor in a number of establishment
clause decisions. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985) (noting that "[the symbolism of a union between church and state is most
likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited"); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing presi-
dential proclamations from school prayer in that the former are received in a non-
coercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who presumably are not
readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
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c. Trivialization of Religion
In addition to the overinclusiveness of the second prong,
the Court's application of the prong also trivializes religion.
Two arguments that uphold statutes that intertwine religion
and government accomplish this unfortunate result. One argu-
ment is that the activity has become a part of the fabric of our
society through historical acceptance. 5' Thus, longstanding
societal acceptance of an activity makes that activity constitu-
tional regardless of the extent to which the statute benefits
religion. A second argument is that the activity is an expres-
sion of ceremonial deism 52 -meaning that since traditionally
our society has been a religious society, our Presidents and
government are permitted to acknowledge God. These two
arguments trivialize religion, as the Court upholds statutes not
because the Establishment Clause permits a certain amount of
interaction between government and religion, but because the
activities have endured. 3'
The fabric-of-society rationale (the "fabric rationale") fo-
cuses on society's repeated historical acceptance of and contin-
ued exposure to a religious activity. For example, in Marsh v.
Chambers, the Court upheld a state statute that paid a
chaplain to conduct prayers each morning in the legislative
chambers. 5 The Court explained that "[i]n light of the un-
U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (noting that university students are young adults who
are less impressionable than younger students).
15 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
12 See infra note 165 (explaining ceremonial deism).
Professor Carter explains that the purpose of his book is to examine:
the attitude that we as a political society hold toward religion. It is not
a call to tear down the wall between church and state or to impose op-
pressive religious regimes on each other willy-nilly. It is an effort to
understand our instincts and our rules and our rhetoric, to figure out
why it is that religion is seen as worse than other forces that mold
people's minds, and to try to discover whether there might be a way to
preserve the separation of church and state without trivializing faith as
we do today.
CARTER, supra note 52, at 15; see also McConnell, supra note 64, at 127 (stating
that the Court does not object to a little religion in public life, but it must be
"tamed, cheapened and secularized").
14 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
1'6 Id. at 795.
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ambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative ses-
sions with prayer has become a part of the fabric of our soci-
ety.... [Ilt is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs
widely held among the people of this country.""15 The essence
of this rationale is that the activity has become such an accept-
ed part of society that it has lost its offensiveness to nonbeliev-
ers.57 This premise, however, fails to consider the religious
diversity of our nation. Even a widely accepted practice can be
offensive to some. For example, an atheist might take offense
to a chaplain opening congressional sessions with a prayer, yet
the Court considers the activity nonoffensive, one that fully
comports with the Establishment Clause.5 '
.. Id. at 792; see also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (referring to the motto "In God We Trust' as one so deeply
interwoven into the fabric of society that its use does not present the type of gov-
ernnental involvement with religion that the First Amendment prohibits).
s ' The fabric rationale also has been referred to as de facto establishment.
HOWE, supra note 47, at 11-12 (arguing that practices that are deeply ingrained in
our society, such as legislative prayer, are "de facto establishments"). Although
these practices have plainly religious purposes they are consistently upheld by the
Court. Id. Occasionally, the Court attempts to explain that these activities some-
how are not religious. For example, a creche depicts a holiday season and is used
for commercial purposes, and accordingly does not violate the Constitution. Howe
suggests that if the Court continues to allow these activities, rather than ratio-
nalizing its decisions or attempting to minimize the religious characteristics of the
activity, it should simply acknowledge that de facto establishments are permissible.
Id. at 11-15; see also Marshall, supra note 17, at 508; accord Mark V. Tushnet,
Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 1004 (1986) (arguing that "[tihese practices plainly
have religious purposes, and no good is done by pretending . . . that the ordinary
understanding of 'purpose' somehow allows a holding that these practices do not
have religious purposes").
But Howe's suggestion does not solve the problems with the Court's current
application of the Lemon test. Either an activity that advances religion is unconsti-
tutional or it is not. Historical acceptance cannot replace constitutional principles.
If these activities are permissible, then a test should be developed that clearly
demonstrates why these activities comport with the Establishment Clause. More
importantly, a proper test would guide courts in future cases. A "de facto" estab-
lishment rationale only hinders the articulation of a workable test since the Court
only distinguishes, distorts or fails to apply the Lemon test in order to uphold
these de facto establishment activities.
"6' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983); see also Allegheny County v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that it "seems incredible to suggest that the average observer of
legislative prayer who either believes in no religion or whose faith rejects the
concept of God would not receive the clear message that his faith is out of step
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In addition to the problem of religious diversity, the fabric
rationale presents constitutional concerns. Because the Consti-
tution enumerates various permitted and forbidden state and
federal activities, the Court's belief that society repeatedly has
accepted an action cannot negate a constitutional prohibition of
the activity.'59 For example, if the President singlehandedly
raised taxes for a four-year period, the action would not be-
come constitutional because Article I of the Constitution clear-
ly dictates that Congress "shall lay and collect taxes," not the
President. Moreover, actions that are not explicitly prohibited
by the Constitution require courts to interpret relevant provi-
sions of the Constitution in a manner consistent with its
theme.'60 The Court, in applying the fabric rationale, has
failed to explain why an early and continued acceptance of a
practice should continue despite a constitutional theme indi-
cating otherwise. 6' For example, in Marsh, the Court did not
explain how the legislative prayers, a clearly religious activity,
harmonized with the Establishment Clause.
The Court also fails to apply the fabric rationale consis-
tently.'62 Not all longstanding religious activities are afforded
the protection of the fabric rationale. The fabric rationale does
not protect school prayer, for example, despite its presence in
public schools for over 170 years." 3 In recent years, creche
with the political norm").
... See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (stating that "[n]o one
acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use,
even when that span of time covers our entire national existence [or] predates it").
C' Chief Justice Marshall explained that "[a] constitution .... [by ilts nature,
therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be de-
duced from the nature of the objects themselves." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
"61 See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that the fabric rationale presents constitutional
problems because the Lemon test must be "twisted and stretched to avoid incon-
sistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the past"); cf. Walz,
397 U.S. at 681 (attempting to establish a standard for courts to follow by stating
that the more longstanding and widely accepted a practice is, the greater its im-
pact will be on a constitutional interpretation).
12 The Court utilized the fabric rationale to uphold legislative prayer in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), but did not apply it in Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962), where the Court invalidated school prayer despite the fact that
prayers in schools predated the creation of the public educational system.
163 See supra note 44.
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displays on public property have been held both constitutional
and unconstitutional.' The sporadic application of the fabric
rationale indicates its ineffectiveness as an interpretive guide
of establishment clause principles.
Similar to the fabric rationale, ceremonial deism empha-
sizes the historical prominence of religion in society. Indeed, in
many cases the two arguments overlap.'65 The fabric ratio-
nale, however, focuses on the role of a particular religious
activity in our society, whereas ceremonial deism highlights
the role of religion itself. The fabric rationale trivializes the
importance of a particular activity's religious aspects to char-
acterize the activity as less offensive to nonadherents. Ceremo-
nial deism trivializes religion through a process of seculariza-
tion. Thus, the Court has found expressions of ceremonial
deism acceptable because, over time, certain religious activities
allegedly lose their religious significance. For example, society
has become so accustomed to Presidents concluding their
speeches with "God Bless You" that its rote recitation eventu-
ally diminished the religious significance of this activity. 66
164 A striking inconsistency involved two challenges to creche displays. In Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669 (1984), the Court utilized the fabric rationale and
described the display as depicting the historical origins of a longstanding national
holiday. In Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573, however, the Court did not apply
the rationale and held the display unconstitutional. The primary reason for the
different decisions was that in Lynch there were other decorations surrounding the
display which detracted people's attention from the creche, whereas, in Allegheny
there were none. The surrounding decorations should not make one creche display
a part of the fabric of our society while their lack preclude another.
16 "Ceremonial deism" also is referred to by scholars and commentators as civil
religion or civil deism. Thomas Cooley aptly described the concept in his treatise
on constitutional limitations:
[Tihe American constitution contains no provisions which prohibit the
authorities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence
in public transactions and exercises as the general religious sentiment of
mankind inspires.... Whatever may be the shades of religious belief,
all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in important human af-
fairs the superintending care and control of the Great Governor of the
Universe.... No principle of constitutional law is violated when thanks-
giving or fast days are appointed, when chaplains are designated for the
army and navy....
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 470-
71 (8th ed. 1927).
16 Under this rationale, President Washington's Thanksgiving Day Proclamation
giving thanks to God, coins that bear the words "In God We Trust," and the
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The Constitution, however, does not mandate that religion be
secularized in order to be the proper subject of a state stat-
ute.16
7
2. Proposed Second Prong
To determine whether a statute satisfies Lemon's second
prong, the Court should perform a revised three-part inquiry.
First, the Court should determine whether the statute coerces
support for, or participation in, religion. This coercion standard
would include direct and indirect coercion. Direct coercion
would encompass statutes that secure religious adherence
through intimidation or punishment-criminal or civil. Indirect
coercion would encompass situations where people, such as
students, have no choice but to participate in the religious
Pledge of Allegiance which refers to "One Nation Under God," are not establish-
ments of religion.
In Allegheny, the Court invalidated a statute that required the reading of
Bible verses or recitation of prayer at the beginning of each school day. Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 573. Justice Brennan pointed out that many religious people opposed
the statute because they feared that compelled religious observances would eventu-
ally deteriorate into an empty formality. Id. at 284 n.60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Anna Quindlen discussed this phenomenon through reference to her own childhood:
rm not making light of prayer here, but of so-called school prayer, which
bears as much resemblance to real spiritual experience as that freeze-
dried astronaut food bears to a nice standing rib roast. From what I
remember of praying in school, it was almost an insult to God, a rote
exercise in moving your mouth while daydreaming.
Anna Quindlen, School Prayer Issue All Symbol, No Spirit, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 11,
1994, at 5G.
Ceremonial deism relies on this type of desensitization to render inherently
religious activities, like prayer, nonoffensive to the Establishment Clause. Thus, it
is not surprising that both religious and nonreligious groups want the Court to
articulate a clear standard for all establishment clause challenges.
"' McConnell, supra note 64, at 127 ('The Court does not object to a little
religion in our public life. But the religion must be tamed, cheapened and secular-
ized."). Other courts have expressed similar concerns. In a concurring opinion in
Sherman v. Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993), Judge Manion concluded that recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools is constitutional, but disagreed with the
majority's rationale for this decision. He noted that a civic reference to God does
not become permissible only when it has been repeated so often that "it is sapped
of religious significance." Id. at 448. Such an approach implies that these civic
references to God, when initially passed by Congress, violated the Establishment
Clause because "they had not yet been rendered meaningless by repetitive
use... . Such state action simply does not amount to an establishment of reli-
gion." Id. at 448.
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activity. 6 ' Daily recitation of prayer in school classrooms
would constitute indirect coercion because students continually
would be confronted with a dilemma: participate in the prayer
against their wishes or leave the classroom and face potential
ridicule by peers. Reading the Bible or the Koran as literature,
however, is noncoercive exposure to religion for the legitimate
secular purpose of enhancing academic freedom.6 ' This test
differs from the Court's current coercion analysis because it
does not rely on the students' subjective feeling of coercion but
on overt manifestations of coercion.' This coercion test also
would be consistent with the requirement of standing in other
areas of constitutional law.17" ' For example, racial minorities
who allege that they have been stigmatized by government
166 A clear case of coercion occurred in Wingfield High School. The principal,
Mr. Knox, allowed a nondenominational prayer to be read over the school loud-
speaker during the morning announcements. The prayer read: "Almighty God, we
ask that you bless our parents, teachers and country throughout the day. In your
name we pray. Amen." Although the students had voted, 490 to 96 to hold the
prayers, school administrators dismissed the principal. This prompted a protest by
students, who walked out of classes, and by citizens, who rallied at the state capi-
tal. See Principal in a School Prayer Dispute is Reinstated, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1993, at A33. The prayers constituted indirect coercion. Even though students had
voted to hold the prayers, there were at least 96 students who did not want the
prayers. Those students were forced to listen to the prayers every morning. This
circumstance differs from the prayer in Lee, where the students had to listen to a
short prayer once during their school career. See infra notes 255-80 (discussing Lee
v. Weisman).
16' Teaching religion advances academic freedom because it provides an under-
standing of our culture, literature, art, history and current affairs. See PFEFFER,
supra note 30, at 361 (arguing that to omit all references to religion from schools
is to neglect an important part of American life).
Although the Establishment Clause would preclude public schools from teach-
ing denominational beliefs, they can provide much useful information about reli-
gious faiths and the important role they have played in society. Even the Supreme
Court has recognized that education might not be complete without a study of
comparative religions or the history of religion and its importance in society.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
170 See, e.g., Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Duncanville, the high school basketball coach conducted team prayers on the
court before and after games. Plaintiff refused to participate. The coach and school
district informed her that she could stand outside the group during the prayer.
She often was insulted by spectators and teammates. The court found that Doe
was singled out and criticized for her religious beliefs and consequently granted
the injunction to stop the prayers. Id. at 162-64. Under the modified Lemon test,
these activities would constitute overt manifestations of coercion and would violate
the Establishment Clause.
1 McConnell, supra note 64, at 164-65.
1574 [Vol. 60: 1535
RELIGION IV PUBLIC EDUCATION
action cannot sue under the Equal Protection Clause absent
actual or potential injury. ' Similarly, religious individuals
who allege that the government has denigrated their faith
have no claim under the Free Exercise Clause absent an actual
or potential burden on the free exercise of their religious be-
liefs."' Indeed, except for establishment clause challenges,
the general rule dictates that plaintiffs who suffer no personal
injury "other than the psychological consequences presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees"
lack standing to sue. 4 In the case of establishment clause
challenges, an objective standard to detect coercion would
preclude invalidation of statutes that plaintiffs merely dislike.
A plaintiff would need to demonstrate coercion-indirect or
direct-or a violation of another part of the Lemon test, to
establish standing to sue.' 5
The second inquiry under Lemon's second prong should be
whether the statute benefits religion. Benefits incidental to the
statute's purpose would not be held unconstitutional.' 6 A
statute that is generally applicable to a broad class would
remain constitutional even if religion also benefits.' For ex-
172 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). In Allen, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Internal Revenue Service's failure to enforce its rule against denying tax
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools interfered with their
children's opportunity to receive education in desegregated schools. Plaintiffs did
not allege that they had been denied admission to any private school. Id. at 737.
The Court held that they lacked standing to sue because only "those persons who
are personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged conduct can sue. Id. at
738. "'TWhey do not allege a stigmatic injury suffered as a direct result of having
personally been denied equal treatment." Id. at 755.
173 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); supra note 100 (dis-
cussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
17 Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (require-
ment of standing focuses on party seeking to get his complaint before federal court
and not on issues he wishes to have adjudicated).
17' Michael McConnell, who strongly advocates a change in the Courts coercion
analysis, also emphasizes that direct coercion cannot be the sole standard to detect
establishments. Minority groups would be subject to the religious desires of the
majority if the Court fails to invalidate statutes that indirectly coerce. McConnell,
supra note 64, at 158-59.
' Courts have traditionally made this inquiry in cases involving aid to paro-
chial schools. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating a New
York City ordinance that paid salaries of public school employees who taught in
parochial schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a general-
ly applicable tax exemption statute that also benefitted churches).
177 Wadz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
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ample, a general tax deduction for non-profit organizations
would still be valid even though churches also claim the deduc-
tion.17 A statute, however, that solely benefits religion would
be unconstitutional.'79
The third inquiry under Lemon's second prong should be
whether the statute prefers one religious belief over another.
Neutrality under the Establishment Clause prevents govern-
ment from preferring one religion over another.' When a
statute surpasses a neutral recognition of religion to the point
of supporting a particular religious belief, then it becomes
unconstitutional. Thus, the overall effect of the statute cannot
advance one faith-for example, Christianity, Judaism or Is-
lam-or a particular sect, to the exclusion of others.
C. Lemon's Third Prong
The third prong of the Lemon test forbids an excessive
entanglement between religion and government.81 A statute
that would require continued governmental supervision to
ensure that religion is not advanced would constitute excessive
entanglement. This prong addresses the concern that contin-
ued governmental supervision will impermissibly intertwine
religion and government. James Madison cautioned that such a
union would inevitably result in the two institutions incurring
the "hatred, disrespect and contempt" of nonadherents, which
ultimately would destroy government and degrade religion.'82
The Court's current third prong analysis generally produc-
es proper results.'83 The third prong should be used only
178 Id. at 673.
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (upholding statutory scheme that
aided colleges through issuance of revenue bonds for projects regardless of whether
the institution had a religious affiliation). Contra Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226 (1992) (invalidating a school policy that excluded religious groups from
renting school buildings while other nonreligious groups were permitted to rent the
facilities).
18 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
1 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
182 Memorial & Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 304.
' See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)
(upholding statute that provided services of an interpreter to a student attending
a Catholic high school); Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (rejecting an estab-
lishment clause challenge to a statute that allowed taxpayers to deduct certain
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when statutes require governmental oversight of religious
activities, or vice-versa. When continual oversight is required
over the other institution, then there would be an unconstitu-
tional establishment. For example, the Court properly found an
excessive entanglement between religion and government in
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.1" In Larkin, a Massachusetts
statute vested schools and churches with the power to veto the
issuance of liquor licenses for businesses within a 500-foot
radius of the school or church.1" The power was "standard-
less, calling for no reasons, findings, or reasoned conclusions"
for the veto.'86 Such a statute presents two concerns. First,
the statute delegated traditional governmental functions to a
religious body. Second, the statute did not specify that the reli-
gious organization act in a religiously neutral manner, as man-
dated by the Establishment Clause. Consequently, the statute
resulted in an excessive entanglement between religious and
governmental functions.
In contrast, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict, the Court properly decided that providing services of an
interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Act to a
student attending a sectarian school did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause."7 Zobrest simply involved a generally appli-
cable law that incidentally benefitted religion.'" Even though
a state-paid interpreter would be on the premises of a sectari-
an school, this did not constitute an excessive entanglement
between religion and government because the interpreter
merely worked at the sectarian school without necessitating
any further administrative decisions by either the government
or religion.
educational expenses in computing their state income tax, even though the vast
majority of the deductions went to parents whose children attended sectarian
schools); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a statute
that vested in churches and schools the power effectively to veto applications for
liquor licenses within a 500 foot radius of the church or school).
184 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
181 Id. at 117.
," Id. at 125.
,"' 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
1" Id. at 2464-65.
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D. The Year in Retrospect
On June 27, 1994, the Supreme Court released its most
recent establishment clause decision, Board of Education v.
Grumet.5 9 This case can be added to the long list of post-
Lemon establishment clause decisions that not only confuse the
constitutional principles involved but also lend no guidance for
future cases. 9 ' Despite the divergent views in Grumet, one
consistency throughout the opinions was that the Court had
little idea of how to apply the Lemon test. For example, Justice
Souter's majority opinion refers to a "fusion of governmental
and religious functions" as well as a "primary and 'principal'
effect of advancing religion."191 Although these phrases bring
to mind the second and third prong of the Lemon test, the
1S 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
"o In Grumet, the New York legislature passed a statute that provided that the
Village of Kiryas Joel would constitute a separate school district and enjoy all the
powers and duties of a union-free school district. Because the residents of Kiryas
Joel interpret the Torah strictly, and limit their contact with nonadherents, most
children are educated at private religious schools. These schools, however, do not
provide services for handicapped children. The need for these services prompted
the creation of the separate school district.
The Court held that the division violated the Establishment Clause. The ma-
jority decision was written by Justice Souter and joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor and Ginsburg. Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy each
filed separate concurrences, while Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.
The majority's decision primarily relied on two factors. First, the Court was
not assured that the legislature would exercise its governmental authority in a
religiously neutral manner: there "was no assurance that the next similarly situat-
ed group seeking a school district of its own will receive one." Id. at 2487. Be-
cause Kiryas Joel was not one of many communities receiving special school dis-
trict laws, and because review of a legislature's failure to enact a special law in
the future would be impossible, the Court could not ensure that the principle of
neutrality would be upheld. Second, the Court pointed out that this statute could
not be saved as an accommodation of religious needs because "an otherwise uncon-
stitutional delegation of political power to a religious group [cannot] be saved as a
religious accommodation." Id. at 2493. Consequently, the statute was unconstitu-
tional. "It delegates a power this Court has said 'ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State,' to an electorate defined by common religious belief and prac-
tice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious favoritism. It therefore crosses
the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment." Id. at
2494 (citations omitted).
"I Id. at 2488 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26
(1982)).
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majority decision did not explicitly use the Lemon test as a
guiding principle.192 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opin-
ion, specifically stated that "the Court's opinion does not focus
on the establishment clause test.., set forth in Lemon."93
She suggested different categories of establishment clause
cases with different tests for each.' 94 Justice Kennedy empha-
sized that the Establishment Clause forbids governmental line-
drawing based on religious beliefs as an unconstitutional pref-
erence of religion.' Justice Scalia, like Justice O'Connor, ad-
vocated different establishment clause analyses depending on
the issue, but based his position on the longstanding traditions
of the people and would not leave the Court to devise tests in
an evolutionary fashion.'96
The Court's most recent failure to articulate a clear stan-
dard for the Establishment Clause merely emphasizes the need
for a test that would properly detect unconstitutional establish-
ments. This year alone, there were over seventy-five federally
reported establishment clause decisions.'97 Additionally, the
2 Indeed, the majority only referred to Lemon on two occasions in "see also"
references. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 2498.
"2 Because the Establishment Clause may operate differently in different con-
texts, Justice O'Connor proposed creating various tests. For example, one test
would apply to government speech on religious topics, while another would pertain
to governmental decisions about matters of religious doctrine and religious law. Id.
at 2499-2500 ("setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes
do more harm than good").
1 Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2504.
16 Id. at 2515. Peculiarly, Justice Blackinun concurred separately to point out
that the Court had relied on Lemon in its decisionmaking. In fact, as Justice
Scalia noted, the majority referred only twice to Lemon.
"2 These cases involve some of the same issues that are litigated year after
year, as well as modern twists to old controversies. Litigants have challenged
prayers at graduation. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th
Cir. 1994); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
Various religious, as well as non-religious groups, challenged public school curricu-
la. See, e.g., Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.
1994); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994).
Students chalineged the Oklahoma State University Board of Regents' suspension
of the screening of the film "The Last Temptation of Christ." Cummins v. Camp-
bell, 44 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1994). Community members challenged the constitu-
tionality of a sign that stated 'E WORLD NEEDS GOD", which hung over the
main entrance to the county courthouse. Doe v. Montgomery, 41 F.3d 1156 (7th
Cir. 1994). A school board denied a religious club access to public school property.
Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist., 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994). And
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Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in another first
amendment case, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.19 Although the circuit court in
Rosenberger primarily rested its decision on the Free Speech
Clause, the decision also touched on whether the disputed
conduct constituted an establishment clause violation. Thus,
the Court is presented with yet another opportunity to modify
its application of the Lemon test and to bring establishment
clause jurisprudence into line with the underlying principles
that prompted its enactment.
III. CASE LAW EXAMINED: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RELIGION
The Court's current Lemon analyses illustrate the test's
deficiencies. The lack of a clear standard for all establishment
clause challenges has produced results that forbid nearly all
instances of religion in public schools. Religion, however, is a
"pervasive and enduring human phenomenon which is an ap-
propriate, if not desirable, subject of secular study."199 In-
deed,
it is the responsibility of educators to "foster mutual understanding
and respect for the rights of all individuals regarding their beliefs,
values and customs." In a nation as diverse as America, it is impos-
during the December holiday season, litigants challenged menorah and Christmas
tree displays. See, e.g., Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 870
F. Supp. 1450 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
A striking example of the lower courts' need for guidance is the Ninth
Circuit's decisions in Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District. In the Ninth
Circuit's first Peloza decision, it remanded the establishment clause claim for a
determination of whether the school district was establishing the religion of evolu-
tionism or atheism in violation of the First Amendment. See Peloza, 37 F.3d 517
(9th Cir. 1994). The second decision then denied the existence of a religion based
on evolutionism or secular humanism. See id. at 519. The Peloza decisions empha-
size that a definition of religion is essential to establishment clause decisions.
Absent a broad definition that encompasses belief systems like secular humanism,
the establishment clause jurisprudence will always be biased against "traditional"
religious beliefs. A Christian will not be able to challenge school conduct or curric-
ulum that advances nontraditional belief systems like secular humanism because
the courts do not consider such belief systems to be religions. See also supra notes
148-50 (discussing the Lemon test's current bias toward majority religions).
" Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 115
S. Ct. 417 (1994).
" Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D.N.J.
1993).
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sible to overestimate the secular importance of teaching this lesson.
We learn this lesson not by being offended or threatened by the
religious symbols of others, but by understanding the meanings of
those symbols and why they have the capacity to inspire intense
emotions. If our public schools cannot teach this mutual understand-
ing and respect, it is hard to envision another societal institution
that could do the job effectively."0
Because religion holds such an important place in society,
public schools should not preclude exposure to religious beliefs.
In fact, a "relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude reli-
gion from every aspect of public life could itself become incon-
sistent with the Constitution.""' The Court must focus on
the constitutional line between the educational goal of promot-
ing a student's knowledge of and appreciation for this nation's
cultural and religious diversity and the impermissible endorse-
ment of religion forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
Three recent cases illuminate the defects in the Court's
application of the Lemon test. In Wallace v. Jaffree, °2 the
Court invalidated Alabama's "moment of silence" statute,
which had permitted school teachers to tell their students that
the designated time could be used for prayer or meditation."3
In Edwards v. Aguillard,°4 the Court afftirmed a summary
judgment motion invalidating Louisiana's Balanced Treatment
Act. This Act had mandated the teaching of creationism when
teachers chose to include evolution in their science curricu-
lum." 5 Finally, in Lee v. Weisman,"6 the Court held that
graduation prayers conducted by a member of the clergy were
unconstitutional."7
Changes to the underlying inquiries of the Lemon test,
while retaining the three original prongs, would produce a
clear standard for all establishment clause challenges and
200 Id.
20 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
202 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
203 Id. at 61; see infra notes 203-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
Wallace decision).
204 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
200 Id. at 581-82; see infra notes 232-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
Edwards decision).
206 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).




create the proper balance between the free exercise of religion
and an establishment of religion. The modified Lemon test
would require:
1. A Legitimate Secular Purpose
a. the legislative body must demonstrate a legiti-
mate secular purpose for enacting the statute; and
b. the statute must be capable of serving the secular
purpose; and
2. Neither Advancement nor Inhibition of Religion
a. no coercion;
b. no direct benefit to religion; and
c. no preference of a particular faith or sect; and
3. No Excessive Entanglement of Government and Reli-
gion
Only statutes that satisfy all three prongs would be constitu-
tional under the Establishment Clause.
Reevaluation of Wallace, Edwards and Lee under the mod-
ified Lemon test demonstrates its feasibility and utility. The
statutes invalidated in Wallace and Edwards would be upheld,
while the Court's decision in Lee prohibiting graduation
prayers would remain unchanged. Because a faulty analysis
can occasionally produce the proper result, the results should
not simply be compared; rather, the analyses that led to the
decisions should be evaluated. The modified test would produce
results that comport with the First Amendment while estab-
lishing clear guidelines for lower courts and state legislators.
A. Wallace v. Jaffree0 s
1. The Supreme Court's Decision
In 1978, Alabama enacted a "moment of silence" statute
that provided for a period of silence at the beginning of each
school day."9 Subsequently, in 1981, the state enacted a sim-
M" 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
2" Alabama Code § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) provides:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the
sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in
which each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not
to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and
during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activities
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ilar statute that provided explicit instructions for students.
These instructions stated that the time could be used for "med-
itation or voluntary prayer."21 ° Plaintiffs did not contest the
constitutionality of the first statute, but argued that the second
was impermissible because it specifically stated that the time
could be used for prayer.211
The Supreme Court held the second statute unconstitu-
tional for lack of a legitimate secular purpose.212 To support
this conclusion, the Court first looked at the statute's lan-
guage. The 1981 statute differed in three ways from its prede-
cessor: (1) it allowed one minute of meditation for all grades
rather than only grades first through sixth; (2) it stated that
schools "may" provide a moment for meditation instead of
"shall"; and (3) it specifically stated that the time could be
used for "meditation or voluntary prayer" rather than simply
"meditation."'213 The Court found the inclusion of the words
"voluntary prayer" to be an indication that the state intended
to characterize prayer as a favored practice.1 4 Moreover, the
Court held, because students were free to pray under the lan-
guage of the first statute, the second statute, which specifically
referred to prayer, had the effect of endorsing religion.2 5
engaged in.
472 U.S. at 40.
210 Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 provides:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is
held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in
duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during
any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
472 U.S. at 40.
211 Id. at 60-61.
212 Id. at 56. A statute must satisfy all three prongs to withstand an establish-
ment clause challenge. Thus, in this case, the Court's determination that the stat-
ute lacked a clearly secular purpose dispensed with the need for consideration of
the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 55.
2M Id. at 58.
214 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
21 Alabama's governor, George C. Wallace, argued that the second statute was
not an establishment of religion, but merely an attempt to accommodate the free
exercise of religious beliefs. Id. at 57 n.45. The Court rejected this argument,
however, because government cannot pass laws to accommodate the free exercise
of religion absent a showing that current law burdens the free exercise of one's
chosen beliefs. Id. at 61. In this case, no statute or rule prevented students from
praying during the original moment of silence statute, so the second statute, ex-
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Consequently, the statute lacked a legitimate secular pur-
pose.2
16
This analysis, however, is improper under the the Lemon
test, because it merges the first and second prongs. 217 The
second prong, not the first, should focus on the effect of the
statute. Thus, any inquiry into the effect of the statute is irrel-
evant and improper under the first prong. Yet, the Court con-
cluded in Wallace that the statute must have lacked a legiti-
mate secular purpose because it endorsed religion. 8 The
Court also improperly relied on personal motivations of the
statute's sponsor to invalidate the act. The Court stated that to
ascertain the purpose of the statute, the Court must ask
whether the "government's actual purpose [was] to endorse or
disapprove of religion."21 9 The Wallace Court, however, con-
sidered only the personal motivations of the statute's sponsor
and that the second statute did not serve "any secular purpose
that was not fully served [by the first statute]."" ° It failed to
perform any inquiry into possible state interests served by the
second statute."' The Court's entire purpose analysis was
pressly providing that the time could be used for prayer, was not an accommoda-
tion of the free exercise of religion, but rather, an advancement of religion. Id. at
57 n.45.
This presents an interesting situation. The Court has recognized that a legiti-
mate secular purpose for keeping religion out of schools is to preclude an estab-
lishnent clause violation. However, there is no converse theory that would allow
religion in schools based on the school's accommodation of the free exercise of
religion. This system is structured to keep religion out of schools, which violates
the neutrality that government is to maintain toward religion. See Board of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 229 (1990) (acknowledging that an attempt to prevent
an establishment clause violation is a legitimate secular purpose); see also supra
note 137.
26 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
217 See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text (discussing the current first-
prong analysis).
21' Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59.
21 Id. at 56 n.42 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); see supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the endorsement test).
20 472 U.S. at 59; see also DRAKEMAN, supra note 32, at 121. Drakeman argues
that the Court's concern should not be whether a bill's sponsors proclaimed their
religious beliefs on the floor of the legislature but rather what the law itself does
and how it is applied. See supra note 95 (discussing Drakeman's concerns with a
first-prong analysis that relies on personal motivations of the legislators).
221 472 U.S. at 77 ("In finding that the purpose of [the statute] is to endorse
voluntary prayer during a moment of silence, the Court relies on testimony elicited
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improper.
2. Wallace Properly Decided
When properly analyzed, the meditation statute in Wallace
would satisfy the Lemon test. One legitimate secular purpose
for "moment of silence" statutes is the state's interest in main-
taining orderly classrooms.' The Alabama statute served
this purpose by using the moment of silence to calm students
at the beginning of the day. Thus, the statute satisfies Lemon's
first prong because the legislature had a legitimate secular
purpose for enacting the statute and the statutory scheme
could serve that purpose.
The Court noted that the second statute lacked a secular
purpose because it did not serve any secular purpose not
served already by the first statute.2 This argument is incor-
rect. Students were unsure whether the first "moment of si-
lence" statute permitted silent prayer, so the legislature enact-
ed the second statute to clarify that prayer was permissi-
ble. 4 Thus another legitimate secular purpose merely could
have been to inform students that the time could be used to
accommodate their religious desires to pray during the silent
period. Second, the earlier statute that served the same secular
purpose is irrelevant. Clearly the Court could not have intend-
ed to set a precedent that legislatures cannot amend their
from state Senator Donald G. Holmes during a preliminary injunction.").
" This interest is only one possible legitimate state interest. Another legitimate
secular purpose is that schools should be allowed to provide a few moments of
silence to accommodate those who would like to pray during the school day. In
Wallace, the Court did not evaluate this secular purpose because the original stat-
ute, with no reference to prayer, was not challenged by plaintiffs. The Court inval-
idated the second statute, which mentioned prayer, because it did not serve any
secular purpose not already being served by the first statute-whatever this pur-
pose may have been. 472 U.S. at 59-60. Thus, neither the district court, circuit
court, nor Supreme Court investigated the purpose served by the first statute. See
Id. at 38; Jafree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983); Jaffree v. James, 554
F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
2' 472 U.S. at 57.
" Id. 472 U.S. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("all of the opinions fail to men-
tion that the sponsor also testified that one of his purposes in drafting and spon-
soring the moment-of-silence bill was to clear up a wide-spread misunderstanding
that a schoolchild is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer




The statute also satisfies the second prong of the Lemon
test. The plaintiffs did not indicate that they were coerced to
pray during the meditation statute.226 In fact, the principle
plaintiff, Ishmael Jaffree, stated that the statute was not im-
plemented in a way that had suggested prayer was a favored
activity. 7 This does not constitute direct or indirect coer-
cion.22 ' A "moment of silence" statute can, however, have a
coercive effect. For example, if most students bowed their
heads and clasped their hands in prayer during the moment of
silence the nonparticipant would realize that others were using
the time for religious purposes. While this alone would not be
coercive, if the school permitted students to harass the non-
participant it would constitute indirect coercion. The student
would feel as though religion is a favored practice, based upon
objective manifestations of this coercion. 9 The Alabama stat-
ute, however, did not present this type of situation.
Furthermore, religion did not receive a direct benefit un-
Cf id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("To suggest that a moment of silence
statute that includes the word 'prayer' unconstitutionally endorses religion, while
one that simply provides for a moment of silence does not, manifests not neutral-
ity but hostility toward religion.").
" Justice O'Connor stated that "[i]t is difficult to discern a serious threat to
religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful school children." Id. at 73
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Indeed, Ishmael Jaffree stated, "I probably wouldn't have brought the suit
just on the silent meditation or prayer statute. . . . If that's all that existed, that
wouldn't have caused me much concern, unless it was implemented in a way that
suggested prayer was the preferred activity." Id. at 90 n.5. He brought the action
because there was a third statute providing that a prayer may be read in the
classrooms each morning. Id. at 40-41 n.3. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed
the Court of Appeals' holding that this third statute was invalid. Thus, although
Wallace is remembered for invalidating a moment-of-silence statute that provided
for voluntary prayer, the case may never have been brought but for the
legislature's providing for prayers to be read each morning. Id. at 62 n.1 (Powell,
J., concurring).
Justice White also noted that if the teacher had been asked by a student
whether he was allowed to pray, the teacher could constitutionally answer affirma-
tively. Thus, the legislature merely provided an answer to the question in advance.
This prevents the child, who would have had to publicly ask the question, from
standing out among his peers, which in turn alleviates the influence of peer pres-
sure that deeply concerned the majority. Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
" See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text (discussing a proper second-
prong analysis).
"9 See supra note 168 (discussing a case that presents unconstitutional coer-
cion).
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der the statute. For example, religious groups did not receive
funding or use state facilities to the exclusion of others."0 Fi-
nally, one faith was not preferred over another. Although
prayer is a religious activity, it does not demonstrate a prefer-
ence for one faith over another."1 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court improperly invalidated the statute.
B. Edwards v. Aguillard" 2
1. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Louisiana legislature enacted a statute that had for-
bidden the teaching of the theory of evolution in public elemen-
tary and secondary schools unless accompanied by instruction
in the theory of creation-science. The Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School In-
struction Act (the "Act") did not require the teaching of either
theory unless the other was taught.' The district court
granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, holding the Act facial-
ly invalid for lack of a clear secular purpose,2 4 and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.3 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the purpose of the Act was to endorse religion and
therefore was unconstitutional.
In Edwards, Louisiana officials argued that the Act served
the legitimate secular purpose of advancing academic freedom
by providing a more comprehensive science curriculum.'
230 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
'" Although prayer is a religious activity, all prayers should not be precluded
from public schools. Prayer is "a reverent petition made to God or another deity."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 976 (2d college ed. 1991). All religions practice
some form of prayer. Thus, under appropriate circumstances prayers would be
constitutional. For example, a nondenominational prayer, like the one in Lee, ex-
poses students to prayer in a noncoercive setting with no preference of one faith
over another.
22 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
2 Id. at 581.
21 634 F. Supp. 426, 427 (E.D. La. 1985).
-5 765 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1985).
"6 482 U.S. at 595 (noting that "because the primary purpose of the Creation-
ism Act was to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in
violation of First Amendment").
237 Id. at 586.
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The Court relied on a narrow interpretation of academic free-
dom to reject this argument. Specifically, the Court adopted
the Court of Appeals' view that academic freedom meant flexi-
bility for teachers to exercise their professional judgment in se-
lecting course material."8 Thus, prohibiting the teaching of
evolution or requiring the teaching of creation-science would
have limited the teacher's flexibility in curriculum decisions.
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, articulated another
interpretation of academic freedom that the statute would
serve. He suggested that academic freedom meant freedom for
students rather than for teachers." + He noted that the Act's
legislative history gives ample support for this view. Represen-
tative Sunderland stated that the students should be presented
with scientific data, as part of an unbiased curriculum so that
they can make up their own mind as to the origin of human-
kind.24 Representative Morris asserted that a student could
not make an intelligent decision about the origin of life unless
he or she is informed of differing theories.24 Many legislators
were not interested in teaching religion in schools, but in af-
fording students the opportunity to hear more than one theory
of the origins of mankind.242 Thus, according to Justice
Scalia, academic freedom ensures that students are free to
decide for themselves "how life began, based upon a fair and
balanced presentation of the scientific evidence."243
Although Justice Scalia's definition of academic freedom
provided a clear secular intent for the Act, the Court refused to
adopt it. Indeed, the Court agreed that teaching a variety of
scientific theories about the origins of humankind, including
creation-science, could be permissible under the First Amend-
ment.2 44 But, this variety can only be taught, the Court ar-
gued, if the basis for teaching the scientific theories is a "clear
= 765 F.2d at 1257.
'+ Justice Scalia explained that the legislature "did not care whether the topic
of origin was taught; it simply wished to ensure then when the topic was taught,
students would receive 'all of the evidence.'" Edwards, 482 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 631.
24' Id. at 632.
242 Id.
24 Id. at 627-28; see supra note 109.
244 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594.
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secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruc-
tion."24 Thus, despite the existence of this legitimate secular
purpose for the statute, the Court invalidated the Act because
some legislators supported the statute for religious rea-
sons.
2 46
As in Wallace, the Court incorrectly considered personal
motivations relevant to a first-prong inquiry. To uphold the
statute, the Court required legislators to manifest a secular
purpose, devoid of any religious endorsements.247 In this case,
some legislators, primarily the bill's sponsors, espoused a reli-
gious purpose for supporting the statute. For example, Senator
Keith repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his
religious views should be included in the public school curricu-
lum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution was anti-
thetical to his beliefs.24' The Senator's personal reasons for
supporting the Act, however, should not have rendered the Act
unconstitutional when the legislature had articulated a legiti-
mate secular purpose. 9
245 Id.
"' The Court acted contrary to general rules of statutory interpretation when it
invalidated the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in
Public School Instruction Act (the "Act"). Where there are two possible interpre-
tations of a statute, one that would render the statute unconstitutional and the
other that renders it valid, the Court's duty is to "adopt that which will save the
act." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 20 (1937); see also
Meuller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (noting that courts are reluctant to
attribute unconstitutional motives to states, particularly when there is a plausible
secular purpose for the statute).
247 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587; cf. id. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
the mere existence of religious purposes for enacting a statute is insufficient to
invalidate a statute; only if the religious purpose predominates should a court find
a statute unconstitutional).
2"' Id. at 592.
"' See supra note 98. The Court also relied on evidence of alleged discrimina-
tion in determining that the statute did not further its secular purpose. The Act
required that curriculum guidelines be developed for creation-science, but estab-
lished no comparable guides for evolution. The Act also forbade school boards to
discriminate against anyone who chose to teach creation-science but failed to pro-
tect those who chose to teach evolution. Further, only creation-scientists could
serve on the panel that provided resource services. Id. at 588.
Justice Scalia pointed out, however, that the Court failed to consider the
current standards in public education in relying on these factors to make a deter-
mination that the Act was unconstitutional. Louisiana teachers who taught cre-
ation-science prior to the Act were scorned by most educators. Classrooms had
ample evolution materials available, but a lack of similar guides for classroom
instruction of creation-science. Thus, in seeking to achieve a balanced curriculum,
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2. Edwards Properly Decided
When properly analyzed, the statute at issue in Edwards
satisfies the Lemon test. The school argued that the Act en-
sured academic freedom."0 Academic freedom is a legitimate
secular purpose, and a statute that mandates the inclusion of
more than one theory on the origin of humankind could further
this purpose." Presenting students with two theories allows
them to make an informed choice on this issue and educates
them about the diversity of beliefs that exists in society. Thus,
the Act would satisfy Lemon's proposed first prong. Further,
that schools should be allowed to teach creationism because of
the importance of religion in our society provides an additional
legitimate secular purpose for the Act. Even if scholars dis-
agree on whether creationism constitutes a valid science that
should be included in the science curriculum, it should be in-
cluded somewhere in the curriculum because schools serve an
important role in teaching our children about their society.
The statute in Edwards also facially satisfies the second
prong of the Lemon test. Because the Court affirmed a summa-
ry judgment motion to invalidate the Act, a limited amount of
the legislators did not discriminate by protecting only those teachers who were
suffering from discrimination. Moreover, ensuring that curriculum guidelines be
developed for creation-science did not evidence a bias because teachers had ample
material on evolution. Id. at 630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In addition to the improper application of the first prong of the Lemon test,
the determination that the statute was unconstitutional should not have been
made on a motion for summary judgment. The mere existence of two possible
interpretations, with legislative history supporting both, presented a genuine issue
of material fact which precluded a finding as a matter of law that the statute
violated the Establishment Clause. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In fact, Justice Scalia
expressed astonishment at the Court's willingness to grant summary judgment
against the state. "Infinitely less can we say (or should we say) that the scientific
evidence for evolution is so conclusive that no one could be gullible enough to
believe that there is any real scientific evidence to the contrary, so that the
legislation's stated purpose must be a lie." Edwards, 482 U.S. at 634 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586.
2Z1 See supra note 109. To ensure academic freedom, schools could, for example,
choose to: (1) merely acknowledge the existence of varying theories on the origins
of humankind and leave any in-depth coverage to individual inquiry by the stu-
dent; or (2) provide a broad overview of competing theories. PFEFFER, supra note
30, at 361-62.
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facts are available on record. 2 Consequently, to determine
definitively whether the statute as applied would satisfy the
second prong is difficult. Nevertheless, the Act certainly could
satisfy the second prong. A science class that includes creation-
ism in its curriculum, without advocating the veracity of the
theory, is not coercive. Students do not have to believe the
theory, just as students currently do not have to believe the
evolutionary theory taught in classrooms throughout the coun-
try. If the school permitted students to harass those who disbe-
lieved the theory, however, then this harassment could consti-
tute indirect coercion. 3
Furthermore, in Edwards, religion did not receive a direct
benefit under the statute. Creationism, which is customarily
considered a religious theory, received the same treatment as
other theories on the origin of humankind. Moreover, the stat-
ute did not prefer one faith over another."4 Thus, the statute
satisfied the Lemon test and should have been upheld.
C. Lee v. Weisman 5
1. Supreme Court's Decision
A school board resolution permitted principals in the Prov-
idence, Rhode Island public school system to invite members of
12 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578; Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th
Cir. 1985); Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985).
' See supra note 169 and accompanying text (providing examples of direct and
indirect coercion).
"' Evolution and creationism are widely accepted as the two competing theories
on the origins of humankind. If, however, in the future a third theory enters the
debate, then schools could determine whether this should also be discussed in the
classroom.
Great controversy still rages over the inclusion of creationism and evolution in
the school curriculum. For example, in 1993, the school board in Vista, California,
voted three to two to include creationism in the school curriculum. The Board
President, who voted to include creationism, said that her constituents kept asking
why evolution was being taught as fact. A board member who voted against the
inclusion stated that teaching creationism is illegal. Board Allows Teaching of
Creationism, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1993, at A4. This illustrates the type of uncer-
tainty and controversy surrounding religion in public education. See Peloza v.
Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing high school
biology teacher's claim that school's requirement that he teach evolution while
barring discussion of creationism violated the Establishment Clause).
'" 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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the clergy to offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of
the formal graduation ceremonies for middle schools and high
schoolsY6 Robert Lee, principal of Nathan Bishop Middle
School, invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to perform graduation
prayers. Pursuant to customary school procedures, the princi-
pal provided the Rabbi with a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines
for Civic Occasions," which recommended that public prayers
be composed with "inclusiveness and sensitivity." 7 Plain-
tiffs, fourteen-year-old Deborah Weisman and her father, chal-
lenged the school district's policy as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
Defendants, the school principal and the Providence School
District, argued that this action was not an establishment of
religion but an opportunity for students to participate in a
recognition of God on an important occasion." The defen-
dants argued that the guidelines for the content of the prayers
were a good faith attempt to ensure that the sectarianism
which is "often the flashpoint for religious animosity be re-
moved from the graduation ceremony." 9 Defendnats pointed
out that for many people graduation is a significant occasion
that requires "recognition, however brief, that human achieve-
ments cannot be understood apart from their spiritual es-
sence."26 ° Moreover, the prayers were merely an exposure to
speech and ideas that exist in a pluralistic society.261
2"' Id. at 2652.
"' Id. The Court noted that the principal is a school official and as such his
actions were imputed to the state for constitutional determinations. Id. at 2657.
" The Court recognized the importance of the occasion, but used this fact to
invalidate the prayer. It acknowledged that graduation is a time for "impressing
upon the young person the role" that he or she is to assume in the community.
Id. at 2659. Thus, a student should not be unwillingly exposed to religious exercis-
es. To do so would convey a message that the First Amendment's guarantee
against compelled conformity with a religious exercise is not an important princi-
ple. Id. at 2658-60. It seems odd, however, that the prayers were prohibited
because students felt compelled to remain silent during the prayers. The Court
expressly recognized that graduation is a time for students to assume their role in
the community. Id. at 2659. Yet, most members of the community would realize
that remaining silent during the prayer merely demonstrated respect for others'
beliefs, not a state advancement of religion.
269 Id. at 2656.
260 Id. at 2659-60.
261 Id. at 2657. Petitioners explained that "endur[ing] the speech of false ideas
or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a
pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the end of
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The district court found that the practice violated the
second prong of the Lemon test and, therefore, the court did
not address the other prongs.262 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed 6 The Supreme Court, like the district court, only ex-
amined the second prong and concluded that the schools in-
volvement with religion was "pervasive, to the point of creating
a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in public
schools."2 The Court stated that the young graduates who
objected to the action felt induced to conform with the religious
activity.2
6 5
To invalidate the resolution, the Court placed great weight
on the alleged coercive nature of prayers at graduation ceremo-
nies to invalidate the resolution. The Court compared the grad-
uation prayers in Lee to the legislative prayers upheld in
Marsh v. Chambers2 66 and acknowledged various differences
that provided a foundation for invalidating the graduation
prayers.267 First, in Lee, students were exposed to prayer in a
setting where they could not comfortably and freely leave. This
restriction constituted a greater coercive influence than in
Marsh, where legislators were free to leave if they wished.
Second, school officials retained a high degree of control over
all aspects of the graduation ceremony, which left students
with no real choice but to submit to its content. 9 Third, the
a tolerant citizenry." Id.
262 728 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D.R.I. 1990).
262 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
264 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-60 (what seemed nothing more than a reasonable
request that nonbelievers respect believers religious practices appeared to a nonbe-
liever as an attempt to "employ the machinery of the state to enforce a religious
orthodoxy").
26 Id. at 2661. The Court's decision would have been correct if students had
actually been induced to conform with the prayers. The students, however, were
not induced to pray, but merely to remain silent during the short prayers. These
circumstances do not constitute coercion and should not be sufficient to invalidate
religious activities. See supra notes 16880 and accompanying text (discussing the
proper second-prong analysis).
266 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
2167 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660; see supra notes 162-64 (discussing the inconsistency
of the Court's prayer cases).
26 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660; see supra note 23 (discussing the facts of Marsh); cf.
Sherman v. Community Consolidated Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that schools may lead students in the Pledge of Allegiance, so long as
students are free not to participate), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993).
29 Id. at 2660.
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prayers in Lee were presented in an atmosphere where fellow
students exerted subtle pressures to conform.27
Defendants asserted, and Justice Scalia agreed in his dis-
sent, that in our society standing or remaining silent during
prayers does not constitute coerced religious adherence, but
merely signifies respect and tolerance for the beliefs of oth-
ers.27' The majority, however, refused to accept this argu-
ment and stated:
[Flor the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable percep-
tion that she is being forced... to pray... the injury is no less
real. There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the stu-
dents at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was
an expression of participation in the Rabbi's prayer. It is of little
comfort to a dissenter, then, to be told that for her the act of stand-
ing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect, rather than par-
ticipation. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group
exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.272
Thus, the Court afforded greater weight to the possibility that
a dissenter's silence during a nonsectarian prayer would be
viewed as adherence to religion rather than to the desire of
some to hear a prayer at the graduation ceremony.273
The Court correctly determined that a clergy-led prayer at
high school graduations violated the Establishment Clause, but
utilized a faulty analysis to arrive at this conclusion. The deci-
sion was correct because a prayer conducted by a member of a
particular faith favors one faith over anotherY4 The coercion
analysis adopted in Lee, however, is erroneous because it took
too many subjective factors into consideration. Such an analy-
sis renders almost all governmental interaction with religion
unconstitutional.275 The Establishment Clause does not re-
270 Id. at 2658 (noting that although the coercion was subtle and indirect, to a
student faced with peer pressure it was "as real as any overt compulsion"); see
supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of subjective
feelings in a coercion analysis).
271 113 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 Id. at 2658.
27" Once again the Court's analysis failed to strike the proper balance between
the competing interests of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See supra
notes 78, 100, 111.
" See infra note 280 (providing two recent cases that allow student-led, instead
of clergy-led, prayers at graduation ceremonies).
171 See supra notes 117-38. Surprisingly, in Lee the Court barely performed the
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quire this result.
2. Lee Properly Decided
When properly analyzed, the school board resolution
should be held unconstitutional, but not because the prayers
were coercive. The legitimate secular purpose for the resolution
was to accommodate those who believed that an important
occasion, like graduation, should be acknowledged with at least
a brief, nondenominational prayer. 6 The resolution in Lee
serves this purpose.
The resolution as implemented, however would fail the
second prong of the Lemon test. The principal selected a mem-
ber of a particular religious faith to conduct the prayers. This
selection constituted a preference of one religious belief over
another. Thus, on this basis the prayers were unconstitution-
al. Contrary to the Court's decision, the prayers in Lee were
not coercive. The resolution did not mandate that students
participate in the prayer in order to receive their diplomas.
Nor were there any overt coercive factors. Students who chal-
lenged the resolution merely disliked feeling compelled to
stand in silence during the prayers. They feared that this si-
lence signified to others that they were participating in the
activity. 7 Subjective feelings of coercion or discomfort alone
endorsement analysis. The Court made a few conclusory statements that the
prayers were an endorsement of religion, but failed to explain why the action con-
stituted an endorsement.
... See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
271 Justice Scalia discussed the Court's holding that the graduation prayers were
coercive:
According to the Court, students at graduation who want "to avoid the
fact or appearance of participation," in the invocation and benediction are
psychologically obligated by "public pressure, as well as peer pres-
sure, . . . to stand as a group or at least, maintain respectful silence"
during those prayers. This assertion-the very linchpin of the Court's
opinion-is almost as intriguing for what it does not say as for what it
says. It does not say, for example, that students are psychologically co-
erced to bow their heads, place their hands in a Diirer-ike prayer posi-
tion, pay attention to the prayers, utter "Amen," or in fact pray .... It
claims only that students are psychologically coerced "to stand .. . or, at
least, maintain respectful silence." The Court's notion that a student who
simply sits in "respectful silence" during the invocation and benediction
(when all others are standing) has somehow joined in the prayers is
nothing short of ludicrous. We indeed live in a vulgar age. But surely
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should not be sufficient to invalidate the prayers." '
Moreover, religion did not directly benefit. The school received
funds for graduation ceremonies, and the prayer constituted
only a few minutes of a ceremony that generally lasts a couple
of hours. Thus, the prayers in Lee would satisfy two of the
three requirements of the second prong of the modified Lemon
test. But all three must be satisfied before a statute may be
held constitutional.
The prayers in Lee could have satisfied all three require-
ments. The resolution as implemented, however, impermissibly
indicated a preference for a particular faith. Selecting a clergy
member from a particular faith did more than expose students
to religion and the opportunity to pray at graduation. It dem-
onstrated that a particular faith was preferred. Although the
prayers were neutral, the rabbi's recitation of them tainted the
state's neutrality. 9 The Establishment Clause, however,
would permit a neutral speaker leading the prayer. For exam-
ple, if a student chose to lead the same prayer the action could
be constitutional."s Thus, although the graduation prayers in
"our social conventions," have not coarsened to the point that anyone who
does not stand on his chair and shout obscenities can reasonably be
deemed to have assented to everything said in his presence.
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681-82 (1992) (Scalia, "J., dissenting).
278 See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
' Rabbi Gutterman stated in the benediction:
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity
for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength and guidance for
the future. Help them to understand that we are not complete with aca-
demic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require
of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to
You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach
this special, happy occasion. Amen.
Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.R.I. 1990).
2" See, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). A Clear Creek Independent School
District resolution permitted public high school seniors to choose student volun-
teers to deliver "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations at their graduation
ceremonies." Id. at 964. The students voted whether to include prayers at the
ceremony, voted who would deliver the prayer, and determined the content of the
prayers. The Court of Appeals determined that the prayer served the legitimate
secular purpose of "solemnization." Id. at 966. The court then stated that since
"Lemon only condemns government actions that have the primary effect of advanc-
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Lee were unconstitutional, properly implemented graduation
prayers should be permitted.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment guarantees the free exercise of one's
chosen religious beliefs while preventing government from
coercing religious adherence. These constitutional guarantees
present a difficult task for courts that must determine the
validity of governmental actions. The Court must be deferen-
tial to religious beliefs, while simultaneously ensuring that
free expression of religious beliefs does not constitute an estab-
lishment of religion. The Court promulgated the three-prong
Lemon test to assist in its task of drawing the line between
free exercise and unconstitutional establishments. The test,
however, has failed because of the Court's improper applica-
tion.
Currently, the Court's application of the first and second
prongs of the Lemon test leads to invalidation of activities that
are actually constitutional. The changes proposed in this Note
would properly balance the competing concerns of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and consequently allow
for more instances of religion in public education. This correct-
ed balance would prevent our society from continuing to inter-
ing religion[, the test] requires us to compare the Resolution's secular and reli-
gious effect." Id. at 967 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the primary
effect was to solemnize graduation ceremonies, not to advance religion. The court
also determined that the statute did not advance religion under both the endorse-
ment and coercion analyses.
See also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993),
where the court upheld a school district's policy allowing high school seniors to
vote on whether prayer would be included in graduation ceremonies. Plaintiffs
argued that even a vote by the students violated the Establishment Clause be-
cause "no minority of students should ever have to be subjected to even the possi-
bility of having prayer included in their public high school graduation ceremonies."
Id. at 641. The district court in Harris relied on Jones, even though it was not
bound by the Fifth Circuit's decision, and concluded that the policy in this case
was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Lee. The court pointed out
that the Supreme Court has had two recent opportunities to ban all prayer at
graduation ceremonies, but has declined to do so. Id. at 643; see also Lee, 112 S.
Ct. at 2649; Jones, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992) (rather than addressing the issue of
student-initiated and student-led prayers, remanding the case back to the Fifth
Circuit to have the Jones court decide it in light of the Court's recent decision in
Lee).
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pret the Constitution as freedom from religion rather than
freedom of religion.
Rena M. Bila28 '
" The author wishes to thank Mary Shein and Cheryl O'Brien for their invalu-
able assistance with this Note.
